G.R. No. L-20751 - Rebullo vs. Palo

On September 13, 1958, Domingo Rebullo, the plaintiff and appellee, filed a complaint for forcible entry against Narciso Palo and seven (7) other defendants before the Justice of the Peace Court in Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
The subject matter pertained to the possession and alleged ownership of a portion of land, which the plaintiff claimed to have purchased in 1957.

The case was heard on November 5, 1958, during which the defendants’ counsel provided an oral Answer because the written Answer, mailed to both the Court and the plaintiff’s counsel, had not yet been received.
On November 12, 1958, the JP Court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in absence of the written Answer.
Subsequently, on November 24, 1958, the JP Court received the defendants’ written Answer.

Defendants appealed the JP Court’s judgment on November 15, 1958, and the record was forwarded to the CFI of Camarines Sur on November 16, 1958.
On January 31, 1959, within the reglementary period for filing an Answer, the defendants’ counsel submitted a Manifestation stating that they were adopting and reproducing their previously filed written Answer (filed with the JP Court) as their Answer in the CFI.

The plaintiff moved ex parte to declare the defendants in default on the basis that the letter presenting the Answer had not complied with the Rules for its filing, and she also sought to present her evidence ex parte.
On February 21, 1959, the trial court declared the defendants in default and permitted the plaintiff to present her evidence in their absence.

On February 26, 1959, the defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default and to Admit their Answer, attaching an Affidavit of Merit and the written Answer on file with the JP Court (which had not been forwarded with the case record to the CFI).
In their written Answer, the defendants averred that plaintiff had absolutely no right to the property, asserting that Narciso Palo was the true owner.

The trial court denied the defendants’ motion in open court on February 26, 1959, and proceeded to hear the plaintiff’s evidence ex parte.
The trial court rendered a judgment on February 26, 1959, which:

Declared the plaintiff the owner of the disputed land and affirmed her right to possession.
Ordered the defendants to vacate the land and deliver possession to the plaintiff.
Required the defendants to pay joint and several damages of P400.00, attorney’s fees of P250.00, and the costs of the proceedings.

On March 13, 1959, the defendants filed an additional Motion for Relief from Judgment and to Set Aside the Order of Default, reiterating that:

Their written Answer had indeed been filed with the JP Court and later reproduced in the CFI.
They possessed a valid cause of defense, including evidence of ownership and continuous possession (supported by documents such as Tax Declarations Nos. 7402 and 7441 and accompanying tax receipts).
An Affidavit of Merit accompanied this motion.

The plaintiff objected on April 9, 1959, arguing that the motion was not verified and would not benefit certain defendants who were already in default.
On April 15, 1959, the defendants filed a Motion for Admission of “Verification.”
On February 13, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the relief sought while striking out the portion that declared the plaintiff the owner of the land.

The Order of February 13, 1960, was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which then certified it to the Supreme Court for resolution, noting that the issues raised were principally legal.

Whether the Court of First Instance (CFI) erred in not granting the defendants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment by failing to set aside the Order of Default and not admitting their written Answer.

Did the failure to incorporate and forward the defendants’ written Answer, which was received by the JP Court after the judgment but before the appeal, amount to a denial of the defendants’ right to be heard?
Was the non-admission of the written Answer and the subsequent trial in the absence of the defendants a violation of due process, considering that the misplacement of the document was not due to the defendants’ fault?
Whether the exception provided under the Rules (specifically Rule 38) for cases where the failure is due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence should apply in this case.