G.R. No. 232724-27 - Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

Multiple requests were filed by retired and incumbent Court of Appeals (CA) justices seeking the inclusion or exclusion of various periods of service for the computation of longevity pay.
The petition primarily involves CA Justice Angelita A. Gacutan’s request to have her services as National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Commissioner attributed to her judicial service for purposes of computing longevity pay.
Other related requests include those of CA Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and CA Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando regarding similar issues on longevity pay.

The original Resolution dated June 16, 2015, penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion, denied Justice Gacutan’s request to include her NLRC service in the computation of her longevity pay from the beginning of her government service.
In response, Justice Gacutan filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that crediting her NLRC service would reward her continuous and meritorious public service and ensure equitable treatment in line with the judiciary’s principles of justice and fairness.
The petition was consolidated with other related matters concerning the adjustment or recomputation of longevity pay based on service rendered in both judicial and specific executive offices.

Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended) serves as the statutory basis for the grant of longevity pay, specifying that it is an addition equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for every five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary.
Other relevant statutes and amendments include Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which grant certain executive officials (such as NLRC Commissioners) the same rank, salary, and benefits as their judicial counterparts.
The interpretative issue hinges on whether “salary” should be read inclusively (i.e., basic pay plus longevity pay) and if service rendered in a non-judicial capacity (e.g., NLRC Commissioner) may be credited as part of the continuity required for longevity pay computation.

The bulk of the opinion (adopted by the majority) emphasizes that the literal language of Section 42 treats longevity pay as an integral part of the salary and is founded on the principle that judicial and executive officials granted equivalent rank and salary should be treated alike.
The Court acknowledged previous resolutions (such as those involving Judge Fernando Santiago, Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, and former Associate Justice Buenaventura S. dela Fuente) that have consistently applied a liberal approach by crediting service rendered in executive positions for the computation of longevity pay.
The resolution granted Justice Gacutan’s Motion for Reconsideration by including her service as NLRC Commissioner, but only from August 26, 2006 (the effective date of Republic Act No. 9347), thereby addressing both the issue of equity and the statutory construction problem.
A dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Brion (joined by others), argued that the grant should be limited solely to judicial service and that including NLRC service is an act of judicial legislation, as the clear language of Section 42 does not encompass non-judicial service.

The Court ultimately modified the Resolution dated June 16, 2015 by granting Justice Gacutan’s Motion for Reconsideration.
It was ruled that her service as NLRC Commissioner would be credited only from August 26, 2006—the date when Republic Act No. 9347 took effect—thus ensuring that longevity pay is computed consistently with statutory provisions and precedents.
The decision was rendered en banc with several Justices concurring with the majority opinion, while dissenting opinions, particularly that of Justice Brion, were noted separately.

Whether CA Justice Angelita A. Gacutan’s service as NLRC Commissioner should be counted as part of her judicial service for the computation of longevity pay.

Does the statutory definition of “salary” under Section 42 of BP Blg. 129 include longevity pay as an integral component?
How should the amendment brought about by Republic Act No. 9347, effective August 26, 2006, be applied to her case?

Whether the inclusion of non-judicial service (executive branch service) in the computation of longevity pay amounts to an act of judicial legislation.

Does the legislative intent behind granting similar salaries to executive officials (under R.A. Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071) support a liberal interpretation of “service” that would include non-judicial positions?
Should judicial deference be given to the executive’s contemporaneous construction of the statute when interpreting “salary” and benefits for judicial officers?

Whether the differential treatment between judicial and executive service in the computation of longevity pay is justified by the statutory and constitutional provisions regarding the separation of powers.