G.R. No. 190445 - Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. vs. Spouses Locsin

A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA – Justice Veloso’s motion to have his NLRC service credited as part of his judicial service for salary and longevity pay adjustments.
A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC – Justice Gacutan’s request involving her past service as NLRC Commissioner, claiming both a retroactive adjustment of her salary (from her assumption as a Court of Appeals Justice) and that her NLRC service be credited for retirement benefits.
A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC – Justice Salazar-Fernando’s plea to have her earlier service as a Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge and as a COMELEC Commissioner counted as judicial service, with a request to adjust her longevity pay from 10% to 20% of her basic salary.

The petitioners, all Justices of the Court of Appeals (incumbent or retired), sought relief to include non-judicial service rendered in the Executive Department under various agencies in the computation of their longevity pay and/or retirement benefits.

Service as MTC Judge of Sta. Rita, Pampanga (February 15, 1983 to July 31, 1987) should be credited as judicial service.
Service as COMELEC Commissioner (February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998) should also be counted, thereby justifying an increase in her longevity pay from the current 10% to 20% of her basic salary effective May 25, 1999.

Her service as NLRC Commissioner (from March 3, 1998 to November 5, 2009) should be recognized for the purpose of computing her retirement benefits.
She additionally sought an adjustment of her salary, allowances, and benefits retroactive from her joining the Court of Appeals on November 6, 2009.

That his period of service as NLRC Commissioner (from November 1989 until February 2004) qualifies as judicial service for salary and longevity pay adjustments.
He argued that Republic Act No. 9347, which elevated the rank and salary equivalence of NLRC officials to that of CA Justices, should be given retroactive effect because of its curative nature.

Administrative and fiscal bodies (e.g., FMBO and OAS) were consulted, and their recommendations varied for each petitioner—generally favoring limited credit for non-judicial service (e.g., only for retirement benefits) while denying adjustments that would improperly expand the longevity pay benefit.

Central to the dispute is Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (“The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980”), which provides that a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic salary shall be paid for each period of five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious judicial service.
Additional statutory provisions, such as Article 216 of the Labor Code (as amended by RA 9347 and others), establish salary and benefit equivalence between judicial posts and certain executive positions, although without expressly extending longevity pay benefits.
Prior jurisprudence (e.g., the case involving Justice Pardo) had allowed for a liberal reading under very narrow factual circumstances where a single non-judicial service did not disrupt continuity; however, the present petitions involve breaks and multiple appointments in non-judicial posts that raise doubts about maintaining uninterrupted judicial service.

The petitioners’ claims, if granted, would have an effect beyond the individual cases since similar issues arise among other incumbent Justices and judges with prior executive branch service.
The discussions also involve whether credit for non-judicial service may be extended retroactively and how such action would affect the separation of powers by potentially amounting to judicial legislation.

Must service rendered in executive offices (e.g., as a COMELEC or NLRC official) be credited as service rendered in the Judiciary for the purpose of computing longevity pay?
Does the rule established under Section 42 of BP 129, which requires continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary, permit the inclusion of non-judicial work?

Can the liberal interpretation applied in Justice Pardo’s case (where a single break in service was allowed) be extended to cases with multiple or significant interruptions in judicial service?
Does allowing the crediting of non-judicial service contravene the statutory requirement and intended separation between judicial and executive functions?

Is RA 9347, which elevates the rank and salaries of NLRC officials to that of CA Justices, entitled to retroactive application for computing longevity pay?
Should past service, rendered before the law’s effective date, benefit from improvements in salary equivalence?

Would extending longevity pay to cover non-judicial service amount to an improper exercise of judicial legislation?
How does the strict statutory construction of “service in the Judiciary” affect the separation of powers?