A.M. No. SB-14-21-J - Re: People vs Gregory S. Ong

Former Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory S. Ong was charged with gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
His conduct came under scrutiny in connection with his participation in a criminal case involving Janet Lim Napoles, linked to an anomalous sale of 500 U.S.-made Kevlar helmets to the Philippine Marine Corps.

In 2010, Ong played a role in the Sandiganbayan case (People v. Lt. Gen. Edgardo Viray Espinosa) against Napoles and others, which centered on allegations of malversation of public funds and falsification of public documents.
The case revolved around irregularities in the procurement process, where the sale of Kevlar helmets was tainted by purported conspiracy and falsification, although one of the accused, Napoles, was ultimately acquitted of conspiracy in connection with falsification due to insufficient evidence of her active participation.

At the 2013 Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing on the “pork barrel scam,” testimonies by Benhur Luy and Marina Sula implicated Ong as a contact of Napoles.
The testimonies highlighted that Ong had visited Napoles’ office on two occasions and was involved in an alleged investment scheme offering high interest, as well as being identified in a photo alongside Napoles and former Senator Jinggoy Estrada.

Following public revelations and a motu proprio investigation by the Court, Ong submitted a comment denying any irregularities and attributing his visit to Napoles to a personal matter involving gratitude for accessing the Black Nazarene’s robe, which he believed had healing properties for his prostate cancer.
Despite his explanations, the Court, after an evaluation led by a retired justice, found that his actions revealed “corrupt inclinations” and tarnished the integrity of the judiciary.

In the 2014 decision “In Re: Ong,” the Court found that Ong’s conduct had caused the public to doubt the fairness and honesty of the judicial process in relation to the Kevlar case.
As a result, he was dismissed from the service, his retirement benefits (except accrued leave credits) were forfeited, and he was permanently disqualified from reemployment in any government branch or agency.

Five years after his dismissal, Ong filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency, arguing that he had reformed, accepted full responsibility for his past misconduct, and had continued to contribute to legal scholarship and public service despite his dismissal.
In support of his clemency plea, he submitted various testimonies from notable figures—including a retired justice, a former IBP president, a clergy member, and a Masonic master—as well as documentary evidence like his NBI clearance and a medical abstract indicating a recurrence of his prostate cancer.

The Court’s analysis differentiated between forgiveness—a personal act of absolution—and judicial clemency, which is an extraordinary, equitable act that involves mitigating penalties while preserving public trust.
Guidelines for granting clemency were outlined, emphasizing that it requires a full and unconditional acknowledgment of wrongdoing, evidence of remorse, and a demonstration of reformation, all balanced against the need to uphold the moral authority of the judiciary.

Acknowledging that sufficient time had elapsed (approximately six years) since the dismissal and that Ong had demonstrated remorse and contributions to society, the Court considered his plea for clemency with due weight.
Ultimately, the Court decided to partly grant the clemency plea by restoring his retirement benefits (subject to a penalty deduction of two-thirds of his lump sum benefit) and lifting the disqualification on reemployment, while still not excusing the gravity of his past misconduct.

Whether Ong’s actions, particularly his visits to Napoles’ office and his failure to fully disclose his association with her, constituted a violation of Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Whether his conduct in connection with the Kevlar case created a perception of impropriety that undermined public confidence in the judiciary.

Whether Ong’s plea for clemency is justified based on demonstrated remorse, reformation, and the lapse of sufficient time since his punishment.
Whether the supporting evidence—including testimonials and documented personal hardships—adequately satisfies the objective criteria for granting judicial clemency.

How to reconcile the need to impose strict disciplinary measures on judicial officers with the possibility of their reintegration if they have reformed.
Whether extending clemency in this case could compromise the integrity and public image of the judiciary, weighed against the principles of mercy and rectification in a just society.