G.R. No. 104782 - Raspado vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner Nely T. Raspado initiated the litigation by filing Civil Case No. 91-58688 for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land in Intramuros, Manila, along with a claim for a preliminary mandatory injunction and damages before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila.
The complaint alleged that the petitioner was the owner of the property, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 194183, and that such ownership was acquired from the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila via an Absolute Deed of Sale executed on August 7, 1990.
Petitioners (the respondents in this context) countered these allegations by asserting that they had been in possession of the property since 1986, having built their shanties, structures, and/or buildings on the land, thereby enjoying a longstanding occupation.

In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint, raising a series of defenses:

The complaint did not state a cause of action.
The real owner of the property was alleged to be Sana Tan alias Paulino Tan, an alien disqualified from land ownership, not the petitioner.
The Absolute Deed of Sale was claimed to be null and void for being fraudulently executed and in violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Dummy Law.
Petitioners argued that, having lived on and occupied the property for over 25 years, they possessed a right of first refusal.
They also contended that no prior demand for vacation of the premises had been made, and that the “barangay certification” was a falsification.

Private respondent Raspado filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, maintaining that:

She acquired the property legitimately as the common-law wife of Paulino Tan.
A prior demand to vacate the premises was not mandatory in cases of forcible entry.
The barangay certification issued by the barangay captain was valid and proper.

On October 1, 1991, private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, with the motion set for hearing on October 25, 1991.
On October 24, 1991, petitioners filed an opposition to the motion, contending that:

Petitioners had been in possession of the property for more than 20 or 25 years, thereby making an injunction, intended to preserve the status quo, inappropriate.
The petition for the injunction was premised on a mischaracterization of possession and ownership rights.

The trial court, on October 30, 1991, issued an order granting the provisional relief through a preliminary mandatory injunction, and the corresponding writ was released on November 5, 1991.
Petitioners attempted to reverse this decision through motions for reconsideration (including a supplemental motion), but these efforts were unsuccessful.

Upon review, the appellate court set aside the trial court’s order granting the preliminary mandatory injunction.
The main issue eventually boiled down to whether the appellate decision—setting aside the injunction—was a result of the court acting whimsically, capriciously, and in wanton disregard of the law.
The controversy also involved the proper application of the guidelines set in Merville Park Homeowners Association vs. Velez, which stipulate that a preliminary mandatory injunction is appropriate only under strict criteria that preserve preexisting possession and prevent irreversible harm pending the outcome of the main case.

Whether the appellate court abused its discretion by setting aside the trial court’s issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction.

Did the appellate court act in a manner tantamount to a lack of jurisdiction by nullifying the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction?
Did the court properly assess the requirements under which a preliminary mandatory injunction is granted?

Whether the petitioner met the necessary elements established by precedent for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, specifically:

The extreme urgency of the matter.
A clear and undisputed right to possession during the pendency of the principal case.
The maintenance of the status quo rather than the creation of a new legal relationship between the parties.