G.R. No. 188933 - Philippine Home Cable Holdings, Inc. vs. Filipino Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Inc.

In a letter dated September 25, 2006, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Fe, Leyte, alerted the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-Visayas about irregular transactions by Melchor M. Quemado, Sr., then municipal mayor.
The letter alleged that as mayor, petitioner approved the rental of an office space in Hayward Travelodge—located 21 kilometers away—even though an office was available in the municipality, and that the rental payment of ₱16,000.00 was made out to petitioner, with the property owned by his brother, Anastacio M. Quemado.
The complaint was docketed as CPL-V-06-0627 and treated as a regular complaint requiring further inquiry.

On October 20, 2006, the OMB-Visayas endorsed the letter to the Commission on Audit (COA)-Regional Office No. VIII for an audit on the alleged conflict of interest.
Due to perceived inactivity by the COA, Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II Alfred Yann G. Oguis submitted a Final Evaluation Report on October 23, 2012, recommending the complaint be considered closed as a case for malversation of public funds lacked the requisite elements.
On February 1, 2013, Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales approved the recommendation with modifications and directed the DO Visayas to determine the possible violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act).
GIPO Oguis, in a subsequent Final Evaluation Report dated February 25, 2013, upgraded the complaint for a preliminary investigation based on the alleged violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and concurrent offense of Grave Misconduct/Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

An affidavit by Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Rosemarie Semblante Tongco was submitted on February 28, 2013, furthering the upgrading of the case regarding the alleged procurement irregularity.
The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO) of the OMB-Visayas became the nominal complainant, and a preliminary investigation ensued.
On September 2, 2013, the OMB-Visayas ordered petitioner to file a counter-affidavit. Despite due receipt on October 18, 2013, petitioner failed to submit any counter-evidence.
On April 25, 2014, GIPO II Portia Pacquiao-Suson found probable cause against petitioner concerning the questionable rental, a resolution later approved on December 15, 2014, by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales.

The revised Information, approved on December 29, 2015, was filed before the Sandiganbayan (SB) on February 2, 2016, and petitioner was arraigned on March 9, 2016.
On April 8, 2016, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of inordinate delay—arguing that the delay from the initial complaint in 2006 until the filing of the Information in 2016 amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated April 11, 2016, denied the Motion to Dismiss and struck down the claim of inordinate delay. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by another Resolution dated June 13, 2016.

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the resolutions denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss.
Whether the SB properly considered the cumulative facts of the case, including the timeline from the initial complaint (2006) to the filing of the Information (2016), in ruling on the alleged inordinate delay.

Whether the delay—from the receipt of the initial letter-complaint to the filing of the Information—constitutes an inordinate delay violating the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
Whether the fact-finding phase prior to the formal filing of the complaint should be counted in computing the period for speedy disposition.

The relevance of previous decisions such as People v. Sandiganbayan, Magante v. Sandiganbayan, and Cagang v. Sandiganbayan in determining the proper starting point and scope of the “delay” period in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings.