G.R. No. L-15939 - Puig vs. Penaflorida

The conveyance was effected by a deed of donation executed on December 28, 1949.
The deed expressly declared the donation to be "mortis causa," meaning that it was intended to take effect only upon the donor’s death.
An explicit stipulation in the deed stated that it “no se registrara en la oficina del Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo sino despues del fallecimiento de la Donante,” ensuring that registration and, correspondingly, full title transfer could not occur until after the donor’s death.

The donor reserved the explicit right, during her lifetime, to dispose of the property.

This included the power to convey, sell, transfer, or even mortgage the donated property to other persons or entities.
Such a reservation was incorporated to maintain the donor’s control over the property until her death.

The reservation was argued by the defendants-appellants to imply that title had passed inter vivos (during the donor's lifetime), which was countered by the consistent declaration of the donation as mortis causa.

The deed imposed a condition relating to the transfer, sale, or conveyance of one-half of lot 58 of the Pototan Cadastre:

If, at the date of the donor’s death, such transfer had not been effected to other persons or entities, then the donee would be obligated to pay Caridad Ubalde (married to Tomas Pedrola) the sum of P600.00.
This obligation was conditioned upon the donee’s possession of the property, which would only occur after the donor’s death.

The condition further emphasizes that the donee’s taking of possession could not lawfully happen prior to the donor’s death, reinforcing the testamentary character of the donation.

The deed’s conditional language and the reservation of power highlight that the transfer of title was not meant to be definitive until the donor’s death.
Comparison was made with the contract in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao & Tan Liuan, where the condition for cancellation was time-bound (six months) and did not affect an immediate transfer of title.
The language and conditions in the deed support the interpretation under Roman and Spanish legal principles rather than American jurisprudence, which some defendants-appellants had cited.

Whether the deed of donation executed on December 28, 1949, is to be considered a donation inter vivos (effective during the donor’s lifetime) or a donation mortis causa (testamentary, effective upon the donor’s death).
Whether the presence of the donor’s reservation of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime alters the nature of the donation into an inter vivos act.

Whether the reservation of the donor’s power to dispose of the property implies that title passes immediately to the donee.
Whether the reserved power constitutes a resolutory condition that merely confirms the passing of title despite the donor’s retention of certain powers.

Whether the condition requiring a payment to Caridad Ubalde (should the donor fail to transfer a part of the property before her death) establishes any definitive transfer of title or possession to the donee prior to the donor’s death.
How the conditional obligation affects the overall legal effect of the donation and the moment at which proprietary rights may fully vest.

How the reservation clause and conditional provisions in the present case compare with similar conditions in other related cases, such as the contract in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao & Tan Liuan.
Whether American authorities on the import of a reservation of title should be applied or if Spanish legal principles are more appropriate in this context.