Case Digest (G.R. No. L-10802)
Facts:
The Province of Rizal v. Bartolome San Diego, Inc., G.R. No. L-10802. January 22, 1959, the Supreme Court En Banc, Concepcion, J., writing for the Court. Plaintiff-appellant the Province of Rizal sought to expropriate about sixty-six (66) hectares of land situated in the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, originally part of Hacienda Esguerra, which had been purchased by the Archbishop of Manila and largely leased to certain intervenors and subleased to numerous occupants. Defendant-appellee Bartolome San Diego, Inc. bought the property from the Archbishop on June 19, 1952 for P880,000, surveyed and subdivided it, and offered subdivided lots for sale on installments from September 1952 to July 1955, executing about 200 contracts for sale.Believing occupants could acquire the lots more cheaply if the government first expropriated the land, the intervenors, represented by Conrado Lucas et al., persuaded the Province to file an expropriation petition on April 21, 1954 to sell and distribute the property to “Filipino bona fide occupants and tenants, and to Filipino veterans” pursuant to Republic Act No. 267. In its answer defendant asserted the property was not a landed estate within the meaning of the Constitution and denied that the proposed disposition constituted a public use; it also alleged willingness to sell lots to actual occupants and charged that the action was intended to delay ejectment judgments.
Defendant moved to dismiss on procedural grounds, chiefly that plaintiff had not deposited the fair market value of the property as previously ordered (May 10, 1954). Intervention by 51 named occupants was permitted; a separate motion to intervene by purchasers of defendant’s lots was denied as they were deemed adequately represented. The trial court, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, granted defendant’s motion and dismissed plaintiff’s petition and the complaint in intervention, relying on a line of decisions including Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, Commonwealth v. Borja, City of Manila v. Arellano Law School, Lee Tay and Lee Chay v. Choco, Urban Estates, Inc., Republic v. Gabriel, Municipal Government of Caloocan v. Chuan Huat & Co., and Republic v. Baylosis, concluding that under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution the government may expropriate only large landed estates and that parcels resulting from voluntary sales or reasonable subdivisions are no longer subject to expropriation.
Plaintiff and intervenors appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the trial court’s application of precedent and urging application of the contrary rule previously adopted in Rural Progress Administration v. Clements Reyes (where a smaller parcel had been expropriated). The Province had been placed in possession after making a deposit; the principal contested question on appeal was the scope of the constitutional power to expropriate land and whether the property here fell within that scope.
Issues:
- Under the Constitution (Article XIII, Section 4) and applicable statute, may the government expropriate the 66-hectare property here sought to be taken?
- Was the contemplated disposition — sale and distribution to bona fide occupants, tenants, and veterans under Republic Act No. 267 — a public use or public benefit sufficient to justify expropriation?
- Did the trial court err in dismissing the petition for reasons urged by defendant (including alleged failure to deposit fair market value) and in applying the line of precedents cited?
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Doctrine:
- (Subscriber-Only)