G.R. No. 205652 - Procter and Gamble Asia Pte. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Petitioner: Procter & Gamble Asia Pte Ltd. (P&G), a foreign corporation organized under Singapore law, operating a Regional Operating Headquarter in the Philippines.
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).
P&G is a VAT-registered taxpayer, holding BIR Certificate of Registration No. 9RC0000071787, and is engaged in providing management, marketing, technical, and financial advisory services among others.

P&G filed its Monthly VAT Declarations and Quarterly VAT Returns for the first half of 2005 on various dates (e.g., February 21, 2005 for January’s monthly return, April 25, 2005 for ending March quarterly return, etc.).
On March 22, 2007 and May 2, 2007, P&G submitted applications and letters to the BIR Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 49 requesting refunds or issuance of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) for input VAT on goods/services attributable to its zero-rated sales for the periods January–March and April–June 2005.
Subsequent to these administrative filings, on March 28, 2007, P&G filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) for a refund amount of ₱23,090,729.17 (docketed as CTA Case No. 7581).
On June 8, 2007, another judicial claim was filed with the CTA seeking ₱19,006,753.58 for the refund on the second-quarter input VAT (docketed as CTA Case No. 7639).
On July 30, 2007, the CTA Division granted the motion to consolidate CTA Case Nos. 7581 and 7639 due to the common parties and issues involved.

P&G presented extensive documentary and testimonial evidence to substantiate its claim for refund.
The CIR submitted the case for decision based solely on pleadings, reasoning that the claim was still pending at the administrative level with BIR RDO No. 40.
On October 6, 2010, while P&G’s claim was pending, the Supreme Court promulgated Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. v. CIR, holding that the 120-day waiting period for the CIR to decide on an administrative claim is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Subsequently, on November 17, 2010, the CTA Division dismissed P&G’s judicial claim for refund on the ground of prematurity – having been filed before the expiration of the 120-day period granted to the CIR.

P&G filed motions for reconsideration with the CTA Division, which were denied, leading to the elevation of the case to the CTA En Banc.
On September 21, 2012, the CTA En Banc affirmed the dismissal based on the Aichi doctrine, reiterating that P&G had failed to observe the mandatory waiting period.
P&G contended that its claims were timely, relying on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 (issued December 10, 2003), which permitted filing of judicial claims prior to the lapse of the 120-day period.
The CIR argued that the plain language of Section 112(C) of the NIRC made the 120+30-day period mandatory and that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was no longer applicable after Revenue Regulation No. 16-2005 took effect in November 2005.
On March 27, 2013, P&G filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Whether the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing P&G’s judicial claims for refund on the ground of prematurity.

Did the application of the 120-day administrative period, as established in Aichi and embodied in Section 112(C) of the NIRC, bar P&G’s early judicial filing?

Whether P&G’s reliance on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is valid in exempting its case from the mandatory 120-day waiting period.

Is the retroactive application of the Aichi doctrine justifiable, or does it violate the due process rights of P&G?

Whether, assuming the claims were premature, the violation pertains only to an exhaustion of administrative remedies rather than a jurisdictional defect that precludes filing a judicial claim before the expiration of the 120-day period.