G.R. No. 212269 - Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Office of the Ombudsman

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed an Affidavit-Complaint under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The complaint alleged violations of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) against various respondents, including high-ranking government officials and banking executives.
PCGG maintained that the actions complained of constituted behest loans, marked by unwarranted preference, manifest partiality, and gross inexcusable negligence.

In April 1979, barely six months after its incorporation, [Marbella] sought financing and obtained an NIDC Letter of Guaranty for foreign credit purposes.
When the initial credit arrangement with Europe-Asia Finance Corporation did not materialize, [Marbella] applied for a US$20.0 Million loan with the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
The loan was approved on September 1, 1980, by PNB under Board Resolution No. 155, with the Central Bank (CB) subsequently granting a corresponding loan under its Consolidated Foreign Borrowings Program (CFBP).
Additional advances were made in February 1983 as PNB provided further funds to cover interest obligations when [Marbella] defaulted on its interest payment.
Allegations were raised that the early default on interest and the waiver of PNB’s share in condominium unit sale proceeds significantly reduced the source of loan repayment, thereby evidencing a grossly disadvantageous contract to the government.

Respondents including Roberto V. Ongpin, Domingo, Gerardo Agulto, Domingo G. Ingco, and others, filed counter-affidavits denying the allegations.
Ongpin contested that the alleged testimonial evidence, particularly the Affidavit-Complaint of Atty. Ocaya, was hearsay and not supported by original documents.
Ingco and Domingo argued that the actions complained of were part of routine corporate and banking transactions, and decision-making was vested in the PNB Board of Directors or the Central Bank.
Vergara maintained that [Marbella] was a duly organized and existing corporation and that all transactions, including the guarantees and collateral arrangements, were consistent with government-supported projects in the tourism sector.
Defenses were also raised regarding the prescription rules and the proper chain of events that legitimized the loan approval process.

The Office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation based on the complaint and the accompanying documentary evidence.
In its August 24, 2012 Resolution, the Ombudsman ruled that the prescription period had not yet set in under either the 10-year or 15-year limitations.
However, the investigation revealed insufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the respondents committed acts amounting to manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence under RA No. 3019.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause and subsequently denied PCGG’s motion for reconsideration in its October 9, 2012 Order.

PCGG contended that the manner of the loan approvals—especially the speedy processing, inadequate capitalization of [Marbella], and the involvement of high-ranking officials—matched the criteria of behest loans as outlined in Memorandum Order No. 61.
It argued that the unwarranted benefits provided to [Marbella] and the disadvantage imposed on the government were clear indicators of a behest loan.
PCGG further asserted that the resolution and order of the Ombudsman were tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, thereby warranting review by this Court.

Whether certiorari lies to review the action of the Ombudsman in finding no probable cause to indict the respondents under Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA No. 3019.

Is the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy to challenge the Ombudsman’s resolution?
Does the evidence presented justify a determination of probable cause against the respondents?

Whether the dismissal of the complaint by the Ombudsman amounts to grave abuse of discretion, characterized by a lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Have the Ombudsman's findings been tainted by manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence?
Did the resolution disregard evidence that could have established behest loan characteristics?

Whether, based on the facts of the case, there is sufficient probable cause to indict the respondents for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA No. 3019.

Were the transactions irregular to an extent that constitutes an offense detrimental to the government?
Was the decision to approve the loans improperly influenced by the intervention of former President Marcos and other high-ranking officials?