G.R. No. 143547 - Potot y Surio vs. People

Joey Potot y Sorio was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar.
The information filed on December 12, 1999, alleged that on or about November 2, 1999, at approximately 3:00 in the early morning, the accused, armed with a knife locally called “adipang,” deliberately attacked and fatally stabbed Rodolfo Dapulag (also known as Pili) in the public cemetery of Mondragon, Northern Samar.
The charge emphasized the use of a weapon provided by the accused and the deliberate intent to kill, thereby constituting the crime of homicide.

During arraignment on February 1, 2000, the accused, assisted by counsel and having the information translated into his own dialect, pleaded guilty to the charge.
He invoked the mitigating circumstances of his plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, having surrendered immediately to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Headquarters after the commission of the crime.
The trial court, satisfied that the accused fully comprehended the consequences of his plea, rendered a Decision convicting him of homicide.
The sentencing, incorporating the mitigating circumstances, ranged from a minimum term of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional to a maximum of eight years and one day of prision mayor, along with an order to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.

On February 3, 2000, merely three days after the promulgation of the judgment, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly stating his intention not to appeal from the Decision and seeking the immediate issuance of a commitment order to serve his sentence.
Attached to this motion was his letter to the court confirming his waiver of the right to appeal.

On February 11, 2000, the private complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (the victim’s wife), filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial through counsel with the conformity of the public prosecutor.
The motion alleged that there were irregularities in the investigation and trial, such as:

Eyewitnesses Eduardo Boyson and Jimuel Marquita had revealed facts implicating two additional persons — Doming Jarilla and Marlito Nazam — in the commission of the crime.
These vital details were purposely withheld during police and preliminary investigations, allegedly at the behest of Municipal Mayor Elito Dapulag.

The complainant argued that the omission of these facts compromised the integrity of the trial, warranting a new trial or reconsideration of the judgment.

The trial court, in an order dated May 3, 2000, set aside its February 1, 2000 Decision on the ground that the proceedings were marred by irregularities, characterizing the earlier hearing as a sham.
It ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and for the filing of the corresponding charge.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the Decision after the accused had waived his right to appeal, arguing that such action would subject him to double jeopardy.
The trial court, in its order dated May 26, 2000, denied the motion for reconsideration on the basis that the State was not bound by the omissions or errors of its prosecuting officers.

Petitioner assailed the orders of May 3 and May 26, 2000, arguing that the Decision had become final due to his waiver of appeal and thus was no longer subject to modification.
He asserted that setting aside the final judgment would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Whether the trial court could set aside a judgment of conviction after the accused had expressly waived his right to appeal and indicated his readiness to serve his sentence.
Whether the private complainant, with the concurrence of the public prosecutor, had the legal standing to initiate a motion for reconsideration or retrial that affected a final judgment.
Whether modifying or setting aside a final judgment, where the accused had already waived the right to appeal, would constitute a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.
Whether the remand of records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and re-filing of charges was proper in light of the finality of the judgment.