G.R. No. 164007 - Gonzales vs. Abaya

The controversy arose when the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired on January 2, 1992.
At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta functioned as the Senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre as the second Associate Commissioner of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC).
The appointment process was governed by Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 223, which prescribed that the Commissioner and Associate Commissioners are to be appointed by the President for a nine-year term with specific provisions regarding succession.

On January 6, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon sought the opinion of Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III regarding whether the President’s appointment power was restricted by the succession clause in Section 2 of P.D. No. 223.
In a memorandum dated January 22, 1991, Acting Secretary Bello opined that the provision did not limit the President’s power to appoint, noting that any contrary interpretation would amount to an unconstitutional usurpation of an executive power.

On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Hermogenes Pobre as PRC Commissioner/Chairman, and the petitioner took his oath of office on February 17, 1992.
Concurrently, private respondent Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed actions challenging the appointment.
Mendieta sought a restraining order on February 19, 1992, arguing that by law he was entitled to succeed Chairman Francia through automatic or “operation of law” succession as the most senior Associate Commissioner.

Judge Corona Ibay-Somera, then assigned as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Manila, denied Pobre’s opposition to the restraining order, ruling the matter moot since Pobre had already assumed office.
Subsequently, Mendieta filed a petition for quo warranto contesting Pobre’s appointment on the ground that he (Mendieta) was entitled to the chairman’s post by virtue of seniority.
At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to submit simultaneous memoranda, resulting in a decision rendered on August 5, 1992 by Judge Somera that favored Mendieta, invoking the “succession clause” in P.D. No. 223, which stated that any vacancy must be filled “for the unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner.”
On August 19, 1992, a writ of prohibitory injunction was issued, directing the Deputy Sheriff of Manila to prevent Pobre from discharging his duties as PRC Chairman and enjoying its privileges.

Hermogenes Pobre petitioned for certiorari before the Supreme Court seeking relief against the lower court rulings and the injunction.
On September 5, 1992, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the enforcement of the August 5 decision and the injunction, thereby halting the actions restraining Pobre from exercising the office.

Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 provided the scheme for the composition of the PRC and included the controversial succession clause regarding the automatic filling of vacancies.
The provisions of the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, particularly those vesting the appointment power in the President, were central to the dispute, with the former empowering the President to appoint heads of bureaus and the latter confirming this power subject to legislative limitations.

Whether Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, specifically the “succession clause” requiring that any vacancy be filled “for the unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners,” limits the President’s power to appoint the PRC Chairman.

Does the clause mandate automatic succession by the Senior Associate Commissioner, or does it merely address vacancies arising before the full term has been served?
Is the appointment of Hermogenes Pobre by President Aquino consistent with the statutory provisions and the constitutional power of appointment?

Whether the interpretation of the phrase “at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal” in the succession clause can be modified to avoid absurdity and preserve the President’s appointing prerogative.

Should the term “at” be construed as “until” to accommodate the fixed nine-year term limit of the appointment?

The proper construction of the ambiguous language in the statute in view of administrative practice and historical precedents within the PRC.

Does the historical practice of appointments support an automatic succession or a fresh appointment by the President?