G.R. No. 212376 - Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

Petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by petitioners Remigio Pillado and Pedro Sarnate.
The petition challenges an order of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros in Civil Case No. 2458.
The order, dated October 30, 1952, denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain further acts of dispossession by the defendants.
The petition claims abuse of discretion by the trial court for denying the motion to dismiss.

The land at issue was purchased on April 9, 1952, by respondents Estela Francisco de Lasala and Vivencio Lasala from the Bacolod branch of the Philippine National Bank.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9455 was subsequently issued in the name of the plaintiffs.
The land had been previously encumbered when it was mortgaged on March 20, 1940, by Luis Pillado (father of Remigio Pillado) to secure a loan of P300 from the Philippine National Bank.
Upon the default on the indebtedness, the land was sold on September 15, 1952, by virtue of Act 31335 to the Philippine National Bank, Bacolod branch.

Instituted on May 26, 1952, by Estela Francisco de Lasala against Pedro Sarnate.
The cause of action pertained to the alleged refusal of the tenant (Pedro Sarnate) to acknowledge the plaintiff as the lawful owner, leading to a demand for ejection.

Filed on May 8, 1952, by Remigio Pillado, Enrique Pillado, Anacleto Pillado, and Mamerto Pillado (alleged children of Luis Pillado).
The petition sought the annulment of the deed of sale executed by the Philippine National Bank in favor of Estela Francisco de Lasala.
The plaintiffs in this action desired to pay off the accounts of the previous owner (their father) secured by the mortgage.

Initiated on August 29, 1952, by Estela Francisco de Lasala and Vivencio Lasala.
The suit aimed at the recovery of possession of the property, collection of damages for its alleged illegal occupation, and secured a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case.

The defendants argued that because other pending actions (the tenancy case and the annulment action) existed between the same parties concerning the same property, the third suit was premature or redundant.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, which saw the separate causes of action as distinct despite all involving the same parcel of land.

The petitioners argued that the three actions involved essentially the same cause of action since they all affected the title of the same land.
The trial court, however, differentiated the three causes:

The tenancy case dealt solely with the landlord-tenant relationship and the tenant’s refusal to recognize the plaintiff as owner.
The annulment action questioned the validity of the deed of sale.
The recovery of possession action was based on the right of a registered owner to recover his property.

Consequently, the trial court ruled against the motion to dismiss and maintained the distinctiveness of the causes of action.

Whether the denial of the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 2458 was an abuse of discretion.

The petitioners contended that all three cases involving the subject property presented the same cause of action, thereby justifying the dismissal of the recovery of possession suit.
The issue centers on whether the existence of parallel litigation (tenancy case and annulment of deed of sale) invalidates or undermines the recovery of possession claim.

Whether the fact that all three actions involve the same piece of land necessarily implies that they share an identical cause of action affecting the title.

The petitioners sought to consolidate the disputes based on the alleged commonality of the title issue.
The court had to decide if each action should be evaluated on its individual merits despite involving the same property.

The propriety of granting a writ of preliminary injunction in the context of conflicting actions affecting the same property.

Although not a central argument in the petitioners’ contentions, the issuance of the preliminary injunction itself was indirectly scrutinized.