G.R. No. 194362 - Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. vs. Dumadag

On February 12, 2007, Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. (now BSM Crew Service Centre Philippines, Inc.) hired Eulogio V. Dumadag on behalf of Dorchester Marine Ltd. under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) for a four‑month engagement as an Able Bodied Seaman on the vessel Al Hamra.
Dumadag was to receive a monthly salary of US$558.00 plus other benefits. Prior to deployment, he underwent a pre‑employment medical examination and was declared fit for duty.

In May 2007, while aboard the vessel, Dumadag experienced difficulty sleeping and fluctuations in body temperature.
On May 18, 2007, he was examined at Honmoku Hospital in Yokohama, Japan where basic tests (ultrasonography, blood, and ECG) were performed; although found normal and declared “fit for duty,” he was advised bed rest for two to three days.
Subsequently, he complained of generalized muscle stiffness; on June 20, 2007, further tests in Japan resulted in a “fit for light duty for 5-7 days” assessment.

Upon completion of his contract on July 19, 2007, Dumadag returned to the Philippines and, allegedly at his request, was referred to the company‑designated physician, Dr. Wilanie Romero‑Dacanay of the Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC).
At MMC, baseline laboratory tests produced normal results except for an elevated creatinine kinase; additional thyroid function tests were normal. Psychological evaluation led to diagnoses including Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood, Hypercreatinine Phosphokinase, and right Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.
Despite these findings, Dr. Dacanay declared him “fit to resume sea duties as of November 6, 2007.”
The petitioners bore Dumadag’s medical expenses, professional fees, and physical therapy costs.

Between December 2007 and April 2008, Dumadag sought second opinions from various physicians:

Dr. Frederic F. Diyco (orthopedic surgeon) – diagnosed right Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and issued a temporary partial disability assessment.
Dr. Ma. Ciedelle M.N. Paez-Rogacion – diagnosed minor depression.
Dr. Ariel C. Domingo – maintained that Dumadag was still suffering from adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, hypercreatinine phosphokinase, and carpal tunnel syndrome; concluding that he was “unfit to work.”
Dr. Nicanor F. Escutin (orthopedic surgeon) – found generalized muscular weakness and declared him unfit for any sea duty, providing a permanent total disability assessment.

Based on these second opinions, Dumadag filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits, medical expense reimbursement, sickness allowance, and attorney’s fees.

On February 27, 2009, Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio ruled in favor of Dumadag, awarding US$82,500.00 in permanent total disability benefits plus 10% attorney’s fees. His decision was premised on:

Doubtful nature of the company‑designated physician’s assessment in light of the prolonged inability to work and the contrary findings of other consulted physicians.
The sudden stoppage of Dumadag’s re‑employment by the petitioners, which the Arbiter interpreted as evidence of his incapacity resulting from illness contracted during his last employment.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision on July 30, 2009, and denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on September 28, 2009.
The petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, contesting:

The reliance solely on the independent physicians’ opinions, contrary to the assessment of the company‑designated physician under the POEA-SEC and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
The interpretation of Dumadag’s non‑re‐hiring as indicative of his disability.
The grant of attorney’s fees despite their contention that their denial of his claim was in good faith.

The CA denied the petition on August 31, 2010 and again dismissed the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on November 2, 2010.

Under Section 20(B)(2) of the POEA-SEC and the parties’ CBA, the company‑designated physician’s assessment should determine the seafarer’s fitness or disability.
The dissenting opinions of Dumadag’s own physicians were not properly accorded weight because Dumadag failed to follow the procedure of obtaining a third doctor’s binding opinion as stipulated in the POEA-SEC and CBA.
Dumadag’s non‑re‑hiring was part of the ordinary end of contract and not evidence of disability.
Awarding attorney’s fees was unjustified.

The case raised primarily factual issues rather than pure legal questions.
The conflicting assessments should favor his chosen physicians, particularly due to his loss of earning capacity evidenced by his failure to secure any seafaring employment after being declared fit by the company‑designated physician.

Whether the CA erred in upholding the NLRC rulings based solely on the opinions of the seafarer‑chosen physicians despite the company‑designated physician’s “fit-to‑work” certification.

Whether the discrepancy between the two sets of medical opinions should have been resolved pursuant to the procedure laid out under the POEA-SEC and the parties’ CBA, namely, obtaining a third doctor’s opinion.
Whether Dumadag’s failure to comply with the contractual mechanism for resolving conflicting disability assessments precluded his claim for permanent total disability benefits.

Whether the petition raises issues of fact instead of questions of law, in violation of the requirements for an appeal by certiorari.

Whether the inquiry into the credibility and probative value of the medical evidence falls within the ambit of factual determinations proper for review by the Court.

Whether the evidence of Dumadag’s non‑re‑hiring by the petitioners constitutes sufficient basis to infer his disability and inability to work, as claimed by the labor tribunals.

Whether awarding attorney’s fees was appropriate in view of the petitioners’ assertion that their actions were based on just and valid grounds.