G.R. No. 154953 - Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.

The petitioner, Philippine Columbian Association, a non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation engaged in providing sports and recreational facilities, owned a parcel of 4,842.90 square meters located in Paco, Manila.
Private respondents were the actual occupants of the lot, while other respondents included elected public officials, such as Councilors Antonio Gonzales, Jr. and Karlo Butiong, among others.
The petition arose from contested expropriation and ejectment proceedings involving the same parcel of land.

In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against the private respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.

Judgment was rendered ordering the occupants to vacate the lot and to pay reasonable compensation.
This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and ultimately by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262.

On April 9, 1990, petitioner obtained execution of judgment, and a writ of demolition was issued on May 30, 1990 by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
Private respondents countered by filing a petition for injunction and prohibition (Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin the ejectment and demolition of their houses.
Concurrently, on June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 90-53531) initiating expropriation proceedings against petitioner.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including:

The claim that the City of Manila lacked the power to expropriate private land.
The contention that the expropriation was not for public use and welfare.
Allegations that the expropriation was politically motivated.
The argument that the deposit of P2 million—representing the provisional valuation of the land—was insufficient and made under an unconstitutional law (P.D. 1533).

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, denied the motion to dismiss on September 14, 1990, and ordered the submission of nominees to serve as commissioners to ascertain just compensation.
Petitioner filed motions for reconsideration and to defer compliance, but the court issued writs of possession in separate orders on October 5 and 8, 1990, thereby denying petitioner’s motions.
In a related development, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53346, granted a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondents on September 21, 1990.
Petitioner subsequently assailed the orders of Branches 41 and 27 by filing a petition before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 23338), which was denied in a Decision dated November 31, 1992, and a Resolution on July 30, 1992.

The subject land was formerly part of the Fabie Estate, from which portions were expropriated for housing through Ordinance No. 5971, passed on November 11, 1966, and subsequent sales or subdivisions.
In 1977, the remaining lot of 4,842.90 square meters was sold by Dolores Fabie-Posadas to petitioner.
On May 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7704 to expropriate the lot.
Petitioner contended that the expropriation was invalid on constitutional grounds, despite the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409) granting the city powers including condemnation of private property for public use and urban land reform.

The City of Manila did not have the specific power under the 1987 Constitution to expropriate private land.
Even assuming such power, the expropriation was improperly and illegally executed, failing both the public use requirement and the petitioner’s due process rights.
The petitioner argued that such power should come from legislation expressly authorizing urban land reform rather than implicit general powers.

The Revised Charter of the City of Manila specifically authorizes the condemnation of private property for public use and the undertaking of urban land reform.
The expropriation was intended to serve the broader public interest through the provision of affordable housing and urban redevelopment.
The provisional valuation of the property (P2 million) was fixed by the court and accepted by both parties, thereby precluding further contestation.

Whether or not the City of Manila possessed the specific and sufficient power under the Revised Charter and the 1987 Constitution to expropriate the petitioner’s private land for urban land reform and housing purposes.

Is the general power of eminent domain, as conferred by the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409), adequate to authorize this expropriation?
Does the power to condemn private property extend to cases where the expropriation is meant to promote urban land reform and benefit a limited group of low-income inhabitants?

Whether the expropriation proceedings complied with the constitutional requirement of public use and due process.

Was the expropriation in question for a public use that encompasses indirect public benefits, such as urban land reform and affordable housing?
Were petitioner’s rights to due process adequately observed during the proceedings, particularly regarding opportunities to be heard prior to the decisions rendered by trial and appellate courts?

Whether the provisional valuation of the land (P2 million) as fixed by the court was appropriate and binding upon the petitioner.

Can petitioner contest the provisional valuation after having effectively acquiesced to it in earlier proceedings?