G.R. No. L-25176 - People vs. Yap

The case involves the People of the Philippines as plaintiff/appellant and Agapito Yap, Jr. as defendant/appellee.
Agapito Yap, Jr. was previously convicted by the Municipal Court of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, for the crime of simple seduction based on a complaint by Catalina Babol.
He was sentenced to imprisonment for two months and one day of arresto mayor.

Following his conviction, Agapito Yap, Jr. appealed the decision via the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental.
An information was subsequently filed stating:

That on or about May 15, 1959, and for sometime subsequent thereto in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, the accused, by means of deceit and false promise of marriage, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously seduced and had sexual intercourse several times with Catalina Babol.
That the offended party was a virgin over 12 but under 18 years of age, which contributed to allegations of subsequent pregnancy and an eventual abortion.
The charge was anchored on Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code.

The wording of the information suggested that multiple acts of seduction occurred, potentially exposing the accused to multiple counts of the same offense.
The defense argued that the information was crafted in such a way that it allowed for multiple convictions for each sexual encounter, thus violating the constitutional prohibition against duplicity of offenses as per Section 12 of Revised Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
In response, the prosecution expressed readiness to amend the information by striking the reference to abortion to preclude a separate criminal charge for said act.

On August 31, 1965, the Court of First Instance upheld the accused’s motion by directing an amendment of the information.
The court’s directive mandated that the information be amended so that the accused would not be exposed to multiple prosecutions or the risk of being convicted more than once for essentially the same act.
Failure to amend the information would result in the dismissal of the case.

The prosecution maintained that simple seduction, unlike some qualified offenses, does not hinge solely on the loss of virginity.
It was noted that the charge of simple seduction applies even if multiple sexual encounters occur, as long as they arise from the same fraudulent promise of marriage.
The facts as set forth in the information were intended to serve as bill of particulars, providing the details upon which the prosecution would base their evidence at trial.

Whether the information, as worded, violated the prohibition against duplicity of offenses by potentially allowing the accused to be tried and convicted for multiple instances of the same criminal act.
Whether the detailed narration of several sexual encounters in the information implies that the accused could face separate charges for each act of seduction, thereby contravening the principle that one should not be prosecuted twice for the same offense.