G.R. No. 157479 - Turner vs. Lorenzo Shipping Corp.

On June 8, 2014, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Misamis Oriental filed an Information against XXX for statutory rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, alleging that he “with lewd design and by using force and intimidation… inserted his finger in [AAA’s] vagina against her consent.”
XXX pleaded “not guilty” at arraignment. He did not file a motion to quash for alleged duplicity in the Information. Trial on the merits ensued, culminating in a conviction by the RTC on May 11, 2017.

AAA (victim, 7 years old) testified that on June 8, 2014, the accused forced her into the poultry house, made her lie down, removed her pants and underwear, inserted his penis in her vagina, and subsequently his middle finger. Her mother (BBB) corroborated AAA’s nervous demeanor, saw redness in her genitalia, and reported the incident to police.
Police officers effected a warrantless arrest on June 9, 2014, then brought XXX to the station. On June 16, 2014, Dr. Grystel Gadian examined AAA and found a hyperemic widened hymenal orifice and hymenal laceration at 6 o’clock.

XXX denied the charges and claimed alibi: on the material date he was with AAA’s parents, eating breakfast, watching a movie, and merely putting water in the poultry house. He asserted that any contact was innocuous and denied any sexual act.
He pointed to inconsistencies in AAA’s ability to climb the poultry house and alleged that the accusations arose only after AAA was reprimanded by her mother.

The RTC credited the victim’s positive, detailed testimony, the mother’s observations, and medical findings; it rejected the defense of denial and alibi and sentenced XXX to reclusion perpetua for statutory rape.
On May 10, 2018, the CA affirmed the conviction for statutory rape and, sua sponte, found XXX guilty of rape by sexual assault (Art. 266-A, par. 2), citing the victim’s testimony on digital penetration. It imposed indeterminate reclusion temporal and ordered indemnities and damages.

Whether the Information is duplicitous for charging two distinct offenses (statutory rape by carnal knowledge and rape by sexual assault) in one count.
Whether failure to move to quash at arraignment constitutes waiver of any such objection.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of statutory rape under Art. 266-A(1)(d).
Whether the evidence also supports a separate conviction for rape by sexual assault under Art. 266-A(2).

Whether the penalty and award of civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages were proper and sufficient.