G.R. No. L-18 - People vs. Vizconde y Santos

The case involves the People of the Philippines as plaintiff and appellant versus Rosendo Vizconde y Santos as defendant and appellant.
The defendant was charged with the crime of qualified theft of personal property valued at P15.20.
The information was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila on April 30, 1945.
On May 25, 1945, the accused was convicted and sentenced to suffer six months and one day of imprisonment as well as to pay the costs.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Manila also found the defendant guilty but reduced the prison term to two months and one day of arresto mayor.

Alipio Orias testified that he, a private of the U.S. Army stationed at Post No. 6 in Tondo Camp, observed the accused on April 28, 1945.
Orias recounted that the accused was seen carrying a bundle wrapped in paper that contained one khaki shirt, two undershirts, and a pair of shoes.
He explained that at the time of the apprehension, the accused was not asked any questions and was immediately transferred to Sgt. Lucero Nardo.
When asked to confirm the accused’s identity later, Orias stated that he could no longer recognize the defendant because a long time had passed.
Lucero Nardo, responsible for security at the camp, corroborated that he received the accused from Orias and noted that the accused claimed he had “picked up” the articles.
Nardo also admitted he could not distinctly recall the accused’s face due to the brief encounter lasting approximately fifteen minutes and because he had not seen him since that day.

The accused testified that on April 28, prior to leaving his place of work, he encountered a bag in a toilet room which was in plain view.
In the bag, he observed one shirt and two undershirts belonging to the Army.
He stated that his intention was to turn the articles over to the Military Police (M.P.) for them to be returned to their rightful owner.
Regarding the pair of shoes, the accused claimed they were given to him during his time as a guerrillero, thus suggesting personal ownership.

The bundle of clothing items, though wrapped in paper, was carried openly by the accused without any attempt to conceal it.
There was no evidence presented as to the ownership or source of the articles within the bundle.
The prosecution failed to show that any of the articles were in fact stolen, as there was no accusation raised by the U.S. Army regarding missing properties.
The condition of the articles (new or slightly used) was contrasted with the timeline which indicated the defendant had only been posted at the camp for four days.

The municipal court transmitted the case papers to the Court of First Instance on the eleventh day after the appeal was perfected instead of within five days, as mandated by section 7, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court.
The rule requires that the justice of the peace or judge must forward all original papers, transcripts of all docket entries, and a brief statement of the witness testimony to both the Court of First Instance and the fiscal.
The delay was noted by the appellant as a violation affecting his constitutional right to a speedy trial, although the court noted that a mere four-day delay did not substantially impair this right.
Despite the minimal impact on the appellant’s rights in this instance, the court stressed the importance of strict adherence to this rule to preserve public confidence and deter potential abuses.

Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the requisite criminal intent (animus furtandi, animus lucrandi, or animus fruendi) characteristic of a thief.
Whether the physical evidence (the bundle of clothing and the pair of shoes) sufficiently demonstrated that the articles were stolen personal property.

Whether the inability of the prosecution’s witnesses to definitively identify the accused affected the credibility of the evidence against him.
The impact of the witnesses’ testimony gaps, including the failure to recognize the accused during later identification tests.

Whether the four-day delay in transmitting the papers from the municipal court to the Court of First Instance violated the mandatory provision set forth in section 7, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court.
The extent to which this delay amounted to an infringement of the accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Whether the delay, even if not impairing substantial rights in this case, should be disapproved on principle to prevent future occurrences.