G.R. No. 135330 - People vs. Villanueva

The case involves the People of the Philippines versus Camilo Villanueva.
Camilo Villanueva is charged with rape committed against Nia Gabuya, an 11‑year‑old minor.
The incident occurred on the night of December 4, 1997, in Cebu City.

The indictment alleges that at midnight on December 4, 1997, Camilo, with deliberate intent and by force and intimidation, committed rape against Nia Gabuya.
Specific details include the accused pointing a knife at the right portion of Nia’s neck and warning her not to disclose the act, the removal of Nia’s shorts and panty, and his subsequent physical actions.
The testimony recounts that although complete penetration did not occur (his organ “did not penetrate” due to size), there was significant contact—evidenced by spitting and licking on the victim’s vagina; even partial penetration is considered sufficient for the crime of rape.

The victim, Nia Gabuya, testified in detail about the events, describing her terror, the threat of death, and the physical abuse she suffered.
Additional testimony was provided by Reynaldo Gabuya (the victim’s brother) and a neighbor, which helped corroborate that a kiss mark on Nia’s neck was attributable to Camilo.
Medical examination by Dr. Jovy Alvarado revealed physical findings (e.g., intact introitus, slight difficulty in inserting a cotton-tipped applicator, and the presence of spermatozoa in a vaginal smear) supportive of the prosecution’s account.
The victim’s prior allegations of abuse starting as early as May 1997 were also presented, indicating a pattern of repeated criminal behavior over several months.

Camilo Villanueva denied the rape allegations, asserting he was at a mahjong session with his live-in partner, Felipa Gabuya, on the night in question.
He provided an alibi stating that he only returned home later, and maintained that Nia’s account contained discrepancies.
Camilo further contended that he could not have been the source of the seminal fluid found in Nia because he underwent a vasectomy in 1976, although he failed to produce hospital records to substantiate the claim.
A medical report by Dr. Joseph Tumala, based on an examination conducted on April 2, 1998, supported Camilo’s contention by reporting the absence of spermatozoa in his fluid.

The trial was held at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Cebu City, culminating in a decision on May 12, 1998, where Camilo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape under the Anti‑Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353) in relation to provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The conviction originally carried the extreme penalty of death and included an award of P50,000 as moral damages to the victim.
The proceedings involved recommendations to pursue additional charges against Candido Cellan, based on ancillary evidence, though these were treated separately.

The credibility and consistency of Nia Gabuya’s testimony.
Alleged material inconsistencies in the victim’s account, such as details regarding her family’s presence and residence.
Whether her testimony, despite said inconsistencies, was sufficient to support a conviction for rape punishable by death.

He further challenged the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for a new trial—which sought to admit the testimony of Nia’s mother, Felipa Gabuya—as well as the court’s assessment regarding the common‑law relationship between him and Felipa.
A central factual error noted was the failure in the Information to allege that Nia was the daughter of Camilo’s common‑law spouse by a previous marriage, an element necessary to invoke the qualifying aggravating circumstance warranting the death penalty.

Whether the private complainant, Nia Gabuya, was actually raped by Camilo Villanueva on the night of December 4, 1997.

Whether the victim’s testimony is credible and free from material inconsistencies.
Whether the evidence, including victim testimony and medical findings, sufficiently establishes the occurrence of rape.

Whether the alleged inconsistencies in Nia Gabuya’s statement (e.g., her family’s presence, residential details, and mention of another alleged perpetrator) are substantial enough to impeach her credibility and undermine her account.

Whether the trial court erred in denying the accused’s motion for a new trial aimed at introducing the testimony of the victim’s mother, Felipa Gabuya.

Whether such testimony—intended only to impeach or corroborate—could have materially affected the verdict.

Whether the trial court correctly assessed the issue concerning the common‑law relationship between Camilo and Felipa Gabuya in light of the allegations and its impact on the imposition of the death penalty.

Whether the failure to allege specific qualifying circumstances (i.e., the precise nature of the relationship that would elevate the penalty to death) in the Information amounts to a violation of the accused’s rights under due process.