G.R. No. 160914 - Dela Cruz vs. Spouses Hermano

On August 1, 1952, Demetria Somod-ong filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental.
The complaint charged Juliana Uba and Calixta Uba with uttering defamatory statements in public against the complainant.
The complaint was supported by the affidavits of Pastora Somod-ong, Marciano Calibog, and Anacoreta Rocaldo.

The Justice of the Peace Court found probable cause and forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance.
The provincial fiscal filed the information charging the accused with serious oral defamation.
A critical error emerged in the information: instead of naming Demetria Somod-ong as the offended party, the information erroneously named Pastora Somod-ong.

At trial, both Demetria Somod-ong and Pastora Somod-ong testified for the prosecution.
Pastora testified that her daughter, Demetria, was the one insulted by the accused.
Demetria’s testimony corroborated her mother’s account, confirming that the accused uttered insults against her by calling her lascivious and a prostitute.
Two additional witnesses supported the testimony by attesting that the accused deliberately insulted Demetria.

After the prosecution rested, defense counsel moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the defamatory statements were directed at Demetria and not at the offended party, Pastora, as erroneously charged in the information.
The trial judge, following oral and written presentations from the parties, sustained the motion to dismiss the information as filed, resulting in the acquittal of the accused.
The dismissal was based on the principle that a misidentification of the offended party constitutes a material error affecting the charge.

The People of the Philippines (through the Solicitor General) appealed the decision.
The argument advanced by the Solicitor General was that the fiscal should have been ordered to amend the information to reflect Demetria Somod-ong as the offended party, citing Section 13 of Rule 106 regarding amendments in form before trial.
It was conceded that the error might have been clerical, yet it was deemed material given that the identity of the offended party is central to the charge of oral defamation.

Was the error in naming the offended party—from Demetria Somod-ong to Pastora Somod-ong—a mere clerical formality or a material error affecting the charge?
Does the error fundamentally alter the nature of the offense charged?

Should the trial court have ordered an amendment of the information to substitute the proper offended party based on Section 13 of Rule 106?
Is dismissal the appropriate remedy when the evidence clearly indicates that the defamatory act was committed against Demetria Somod-ong?

Does the variance between the information and the evidence violate principles of pleading and risk invoking the plea of double jeopardy?
How does this error impact the accused’s right to be properly charged and tried for the specific act of defamation?