G.R. No. 248680 - Migrante International et al. vs. Social Security System, et al.

Demetria Somod-ong filed a complaint on August 1, 1952, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental.
The complaint charged Juliana Uba and Calixta Uba with the crime of serious oral defamation allegedly committed on or before July 25, 1952.
During the early stages of the proceedings, the investigating court found probable cause and elevated the case to the Court of First Instance.

In the elevation process, a mistake was committed when Pastora Somod-ong was erroneously designated as the offended party instead of Demetria Somod-ong.
As a result of the incorrect designation, the trial court dismissed the initial complaint for serious oral defamation.

The Government, acting as plaintiff and appellant, challenged the dismissal by appealing to the Supreme Court.
On May 18, 1956, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the trial court “did not err in dismissing the case for variance between the allegations in the complaint and the proof.”
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the evidence indicated that the accused had also committed the act of insulting Demetria Somod-ong.
The Supreme Court pointed out that, instead of dismissing the case entirely, the trial court should have ordered the Provincial Fiscal to file a new information with the correct designation of Demetria Somod-ong as the offended party.
Following the directive, the Provincial Fiscal filed a second complaint on June 12, 1956 (Criminal Case No. 4239) against the same accused for the crime of serious oral defamation against Demetria Somod-ong.

Without resolving the question of double jeopardy, the trial court dismissed the second complaint by holding that:

Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, serious oral defamation prescribes within six months.
The period from the commission of the crime (on or about July 25, 1952) to the filing of the second information (June 12, 1956) spanned more than four years.

The trial court apparently overlooked the provisions of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code regarding the interruption and computation of the prescriptive period.

The computation under Article 91 states that the prescription period starts from when the crime is discovered by the offended party or authorities and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint.
From the commission of the crime until the initial complaint, only seven days had elapsed.
The filing of the initial complaint suspended the running of the prescriptive period.
The period resumed on May 18, 1956, when the previous proceedings were terminated.
From May 18, 1956, to the filing of the second information on June 12, 1956, less than a month elapsed.
This cumulative period was far less than the six-month prescriptive period required by law for serious oral defamation.

Whether the dismissal of the second information on the ground of prescription was proper.

Did the trial court err in applying the prescriptive period of six months when considering the interruption provided by the filing of the complaint?
Did the trial court properly compute the prescriptive period for the offense of serious oral defamation given the timeline of events and the suspension effect provided by Article 91?

Whether the double jeopardy issue raised by the defense affects the dismissal.

Although the question of double jeopardy was raised, the trial court chose not to decide on it.
The primary focus remained on the proper computation of the prescriptive period.

Whether the provisions of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code were correctly applied.

Whether the interruption of the running prescriptive period due to the filing of the complaint was given proper weight in the computation.
Whether the period that elapsed post-interruption was adequately accounted for in determining the applicability of the six-month prescription period.