Title
People vs. Supnad
Case
G.R. No. L-18747
Decision Date
Mar 30, 1963
Accused sold mortgaged property without mortgagee's consent, causing damage; Supreme Court ruled it constituted fraud under Article 316, RPC.

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-18747)

Facts:

The People of the Philippines v. Pastor Supnad, G.R. No. L-18747, March 30, 1963, the Supreme Court En Banc, Paredes, J., writing for the Court.

On June 5, 1959 the Office of the City Fiscal filed an information charging Pastor L. Supnad and Brigida M. Ungos with violation of paragraph 2, Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code (estafa by disposal of encumbered property). The information alleged that the accused, knowing that their two‑story house had been mortgaged in favor of Teresa Bautista for P2,500, sold the same property by absolute sale to Damian Vasquez for P7,000 and represented it as free from liens, thereby defrauding the mortgagee of P2,500.

At arraignment both accused pleaded not guilty. On March 28, 1960 the accused raised a prejudicial‑question plea, relying on findings in Civil Case No. 39224 (Teresa Bautista and Eduardo Dava v. Pastor Supnad, Brigida Ungos and Damian Vasquez) decided by the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, where the CFI had observed that the vendee Damian Vasquez knew of the mortgage and should pay the indebtedness. The trial court ordered memoranda and, after considering them, rendered judgment on May 7, 1960 dismissing the criminal information mainly on the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute an offense because (a) estafa under Art. 316(2) required fraud practiced on the vendee at the time of sale, (b) the misrepresentation must have been made to the mortgagee to ground criminal liability, and (c) the mortgagee here apparently knew of the encumbrance.

The People appealed to the Court of Appeals, which (after reviewing Art. 316 and relevant authorities such as People v. Mariano and People v. Fabricante) held that the trial court erred. The Court of Appeals found the mortgage unrecorded and that the mortgagee could thereby be prejudiced; Art. 316(2) penalizes the disposal of encumbered real property knowing of the encumbrance even though it is not recorded. It further held that the factual findings in the civil case (which was not final and was pending appeal) could not be treated as a prejudicial question that would bar the criminal prosecution. The Cour...(Subscriber-Only)

Issues:

  • Do findings in a pending civil action constitute a prejudicial question that bars a criminal prosecution for estafa under Article 316(2) of the Revised Penal Code?
  • Do the facts alleged in the information — disposal of mortgaged real property by vendors who knew of the mortgage though it was not recorded — constitute an offense under Article 316(2...(Subscriber-Only)

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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