G.R. No. L-20138 - People vs. Segarino y Borga

The trial for theft under People vs. Dominador Segarino et al. (Case No. 58507) was set for August 2, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Accused Gregorio de Guzman failed to appear on the designated trial date; a family member filed a motion for postponement claiming that the accused was sick.
The motion was accompanied by a medical certificate, which notably was not attested under oath.

The trial court deemed the motion for postponement a "sham" because of the unsworn medical certificate, and ordered the immediate issuance of a new warrant of arrest.
The court also ordered the confiscation of the bail bond posted by Liberty Insurance Corporation amounting to P2,000.00.
A policeman was dispatched to arrest the accused but reported that he was not at his residence.

On August 9, 1961, Liberty Insurance Corporation received a copy of the confiscation order.
On September 6, 1961, the bonding company filed a motion to extend the thirty-day period to produce the accused, set to expire on September 9, 1961.

The motion asserted that the accused was “already under the custody and pending transfer to the City Jail.”
It also stated that a certificate of confinement had been requested from the City Jail authorities but had not yet been issued.
The movant prayed for an additional thirty-day period to produce either the confinement certificate or the body of the accused.

On September 12, 1961, the court denied the motion, noting there was no proof that the accused had indeed been captured or detained, and ordered the execution against the bond.
On September 15, 1961, the bonding company filed another motion to lift the order of confiscation in return for the surrender of the accused and cancellation of his bond, accompanied by a certificate from the police confirming the accused’s confinement at the City Jail.
On September 19, 1961, the court rendered an order accepting the surrender but simultaneously denied the cancellation of the bond.
On September 21, 1961, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the bonding company, seeking to lift the execution order.

The bonding company reiterated that the accused was notified of the trial ten days in advance.
It contended that the accused failed to appear due to illness, describing his condition in great detail (inability to move, swollen ears with obnoxious substances flowing, etc.).
The bonding company mentioned difficulties in locating the accused, who had moved to another address, noting that he had been apprehended on September 4, 1961 and turned over to the City Jail.
Despite these assertions, the certificate of confinement had not been issued before the production period expired.

On September 25, 1961, the court denied both the motion for reconsideration and the petition to lift the execution order.

The court stressed that the bonding company’s mere notification of the accused did not satisfy its undertaking as surety.
The explanation via the medical certificate was dismissed as unsatisfactory due to its lack of proper verification and the fact that the accused could not be found at his residence.

Liberty Insurance Corporation, acting as the appellant, appealed the order of execution to the Court of Appeals, which certified the appeal directly to the Supreme Court as a question of law.
The appellant argued compliance with Section 15, Rule 110 (now Rule 114) of the Rules of Court, contending that its motion explaining the non-production of the accused should have precluded the forfeiture of the bond.

Section 15, Rule 110 stipulates that when a defendant is required to appear before the court, his sureties must be notified to produce him on a given date, failing which the bond is hereby forfeited.
The bondsmen are given thirty days within which to either produce the accused or show cause for why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the bond amount.
Two requisites are mandated:

Production of the accused, or an explanation for non-production within the thirty-day period.
A satisfactory explanation as to why the defendant did not appear when first required.

The court found that the appellant’s assertion of detention was unsubstantiated; mere claim of capture and pending confinement without proper certification was insufficient.
The explanation that the accused was notified instead of produced did not fulfill the bondsman’s obligation, as his responsibility extends to ensuring the accused's physical presence before the court.

In its submission, the appellant sought an alternative relief proposing a reduction of its liability to 10% of the bond amount.
The court noted precedents (People vs. Puyat, People vs. Reyes, People vs. Alamada) where partial remission of liability was granted once the accused was eventually produced, subject to the circumstances of each case.
However, in the present case, given that the accused’s non-appearance remained unexplained satisfactorily, the appellant’s liability under the bond was reduced to one-half of its original amount.

Whether the appellant complied with the requirements of Section 15, Rule 110 (now Rule 114) of the Rules of Court by adequately explaining the non-production of the accused within the stipulated thirty-day period.
Whether the mere act of notifying the accused of the trial date suffices as an explanation for his absence, considering the bondsman’s obligation to produce the accused in person.
Whether the alleged sickness of the accused, supported by an unsworn medical certificate, constitutes a credible and satisfactory explanation for his failure to appear, particularly in light of evidence that the accused could not be found at his residence.
Whether the appellant is entitled to the alternative relief of reducing its bond liability to 10% of the amount, or whether, given the lack of satisfactory explanation, a more substantial reduction (i.e., one-half of the bond amount) is warranted.