G.R. No. 48183 - People vs. Schneckenburger

On March 16, 1926, the accused, Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger, married the complainant, Elena Ramirez Cartagena.
After seven years of marital life, both parties agreed to live separately due to alleged incompatibility of character.
On May 25, 1935, they executed a document which, among other provisions, stated that both parties consented to live apart for the rest of their lives and undertook not to interfere in each other’s personal or public affairs, thereby affirming complete freedom in their actions.

On June 15, 1935, while still in the Philippines, Schneckenburger secured a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, in the State of Chihuahua, Mexico.
On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, at the justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and they subsequently lived together as husband and wife in Manila.

An action for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which led to his conviction and a sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
An action for concubinage in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Schneckenburger interposed the plea of double jeopardy, leading initially to the dismissal of the case before trial.
Upon appeal by the fiscal, the Court ruled that the dismissal was premature and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

Eventually, he was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to the same penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.

The separation document, although executed for an illegal purpose (i.e. to serve as a consent for an illicit arrangement), was pivotal in the legal analysis.
The court differentiated:

Bigamy, characterized by contracting a second marriage while the first remained legally valid, an offense against civil status prosecutable at the state's instance.
Concubinage, characterized by the mere cohabitation of a husband with a woman who is not his wife, an offense against chastity that may be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party.

The accused argued that being tried for concubinage after his conviction for bigamy constituted double jeopardy.
The court clarified that although tried for two offenses, they were distinct in law, facts, and mode of prosecution, thereby negating the double jeopardy claim.

Whether the plea of double jeopardy is sustainable considering that the offenses of bigamy and concubinage are distinct in elements and mode of prosecution.
Whether the separation agreement executed by the parties, despite its illegality for its intended purpose, constitutes a valid prior consent to the act of concubinage under Section 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether prior consent, as evidenced in the document, effectively bars the offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution for concubinage.
What legal implications follow when the offended party relinquishes the right to prosecute by giving prior consent—a consent that operates as a bar to criminal prosecution.