G.R. No. 166510 - People vs. Romualdez

The case involves a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by the People of the Philippines against Benjamin “Kokoy” T. Romualdez and the Sandiganbayan (First Division).
The petition challenged two Sandiganbayan Resolutions—the first dated 22 June 2004 granting Romualdez’s motion to quash the Information, and the second dated 23 November 2004 denying the People’s motion for reconsideration of the first resolution.
The Information in criminal case No. 26916 charged Romualdez, then the Provincial Governor of Leyte, with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) by allegedly causing “undue injury” to the government.

The Office of the Ombudsman had charged Romualdez with receiving dual compensation by holding two incompatible government positions concurrently—as Governor of Leyte and as Ambassador to multiple countries (People’s Republic of China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United States).
It was alleged that by employing his influence—even through his relation with then-President Ferdinand Marcos—Romualdez had gotten himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador despite the constitutional and statutory prohibition against holding two offices simultaneously.
The Information alleged that Romualdez collected financial compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte, amounting to significant sums which purportedly amounted to “undue injury” to the government.
Romualdez argued, on his motion to quash, that:

The facts set out in the Information did not constitute an offense under RA 3019, particularly because the law applies to acts involving the grant of licenses, permits, or concessions—a circumstance not relevant to his alleged “dual compensation”.
His criminal liability had been extinguished by prescription, asserting that the 15-year period (as provided under Section 11 of RA 3019) had lapsed and that prior proceedings (such as the complaint filed with the PCGG) were null and void.

The Sandiganbayan, in its first resolution, held that the allegation of damage or undue injury was unwarranted because it was not shown that Romualdez failed to render services for his dual offices.
The Sandiganbayan further noted that receiving compensation for rendered services did not automatically amount to illegality or unjust enrichment, and that any inefficiency arising from holding two positions could be treated as an administrative matter.
In its second resolution, the Sandiganbayan reiterated that:

The act of appointment, even if deemed contrary to law, could be attributed to the appointing authority (here, historically associated with President Marcos), and
The allegation that receiving dual compensation did not lead to any damage to the government was supported by the notion that compensation was for actual services rendered.

On appeal, the People contended that the proper remedy was not available, stating that the nature and public interest of the issues raised justified the use of Rule 65 even though Rule 45 provides the normal appellate remedy.
Romualdez countered that his case should instead be reviewed under Rule 45 because the Sandiganbayan’s orders were final, and that a Rule 65 petition was being misused as a substitute for a lost appeal.

Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can be availed when a proper appeal under Rule 45 is available.
The threshold inquiry concerning the exhaustion of the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Whether the facts alleged in the Information, particularly the dual compensation received by Romualdez, sufficiently establish the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Whether the requirement to prove that no actual service was rendered (as inferred by the Sandiganbayan) is an improper or extraneous matter that exceeds the ultimate facts required in an Information.

Whether Romualdez’s assertion that the criminal action or liability was already extinguished by prescription is tenable under the facts.
The implications of prior PCGG proceedings and the absence of any interruption to the prescriptive period for offenses under the applicable law.

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion by quashing the Information based on its extraneous findings and assumptions that effectively amounted to ruling on matters for trial.
Whether its premature resolution on disputed evidentiary matters (such as the rendering of services) and legal misinterpretations fell outside the bounds of its jurisdiction.