G.R. No. L-30165 - People vs. Resuello

The People of the Philippines, as plaintiff-appellant, initiated an appeal by certiorari against Rosendo Resuello, defendant-appellee, and his codefendants.
The accused, Rosendo Resuello—alleged president and general manager of the Security Credit and Acceptance Corporation—and his codefendants (John Doe, Peter Doe, Edward Doe, Anthony Doe, Bennie Doe, and Charles Doe) were charged with estafa.
The nature of the charge involves misapplication, misappropriation, and conversion of money entrusted to them in a fiduciary relationship.

In or about October 1962 in the municipality of Guagua, Pampanga, Florentina G. Limpin deposited a sum of P800.00.

The accused, representing themselves as officers and employees of the Security Credit and Acceptance Corporation, received the money on deposit.
It was understood that the money was to be returned upon demand, establishing a trust-like obligation.

Instead of fulfilling the obligation, the accused allegedly misapplied, misappropriated, and converted the amount to their own personal use and benefit.

The information explicitly states that despite repeated and insistent demands by Florentina G. Limpin, the accused failed to return the deposited sum.
The allegations incorporate the element of deceit and grave abuse of confidence.

The Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in its October 10, 1968 order, granted the motion to quash the information filed against Resuello and his co-accused.
The lower court adjudged the transaction as a “simple loan” governed by Article 1980 of the New Civil Code.

It held that the legal relation between the accused and Florentina was that of creditor and debtor, thereby giving rise to a civil obligation rather than a criminal offense.
The presence of fraud, in the lower court’s view, supported a civil action for misappropriation but was not sufficient to constitute criminal estafa under the Revised Penal Code.

Additionally, the order mentioned possible violations of Republic Acts Nos. 265 and 337, clarifying that such violations were separate and did not warrant a prosecution for estafa.

The prosecution contended that the lower court erred in characterizing the transaction merely as a simple loan.

It argued that the allegations—as contained in the information—clearly indicated that the accused received money in a fiduciary capacity with an obligation to return upon demand.
The misappropriation of the funds for personal benefit, especially with the knowledge that the Security Credit and Acceptance Corporation was not duly authorized to operate as a bank, was indicative of criminal behavior.

The prosecution also asserted that the legal relationship described in the information was directly between Florentina G. Limpin and the accused, and not between a depositor and a banking institution.

Whether the transaction described in the information should be legally characterized as a simple loan under Article 1980 of the New Civil Code or as a transaction involving a fiduciary trust, thereby constituting estafa.
Whether the alleged misapplication, misappropriation, and conversion of the deposited money by Resuello and his co-accused satisfy the elements of the crime of estafa under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether the legal relationship between Florentina G. Limpin and the accused—emphasizing personal responsibility over corporate obligation—merits classification as a criminal act rather than a mere breach of a civil contract.
Whether the lower court erred in excluding the criminal aspect of the offense by relying solely on the provisions of Article 1980, which typically govern relations involving banks and similar institutions.
Whether the reference to possible violations of Republic Acts Nos. 265 and 337 should influence the determination of criminal liability for estafa.