G.R. No. L-47462 - People vs. Parohinog

Wilson Parohinog, along with co-accused Soterania Parohinog, Robinson Parohinog, Loreto Parohinog, and Rodulfo Teodore, was originally charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Criminal Case No. 121.
At arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the information.
After the prosecution rested its case, defense counsel announced that Wilson Parohinog wished to change his plea from not guilty to guilty to the lesser offense of homicide.
The prosecuting fiscal consented, and Wilson was re-arraigned accordingly as having pleaded guilty to homicide.
Subsequently, on March 16, 1973, after the presentation of the defense’s first witness, Wilson, through counsel, filed a written motion requesting to change his plea from guilty to not guilty, contending that he did not fully comprehend the consequences of his guilty plea and asserting he had a valid, meritorious defense.

"As prayed for by the accused that the motion to his plea of guilty to that of not guilty be withdrawn, and finding it to be justified, the same is granted."

One view held that the court merely granted the withdrawal of Wilson’s motion to change his plea, leaving his plea of guilty to homicide intact.
An alternative view suggested the court had allowed the withdrawal of the plea of guilty, thus reverting to a plea of not guilty to the original charge of murder.

The prosecution’s evidence, including testimonies by various witnesses, indicated that the crime committed was homicide rather than murder.

The trial court noted that although the information alleged evident premeditation and abuse of superiority, it ultimately found no abuse of superiority and did not conclusively find premeditation.
The court emphasized that the evidence supported the commission of homicide, with the presence of mitigating circumstances such as immediate vindication of a grave offense and voluntary surrender by the accused.

Based on the evidence, the prosecution’s case did not sustain a conviction for murder.

Initially, the trial court convicted Wilson of murder, imposing a straight penalty of 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as well as ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased with P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals and subsequently the Supreme Court examined the proper effect of the plea change after the prosecution had rested its case.
The Supreme Court held that, given the evidence, Wilson should be convicted solely of homicide.
The penalty was modified to reflect the conviction for homicide, with the imposition of an indeterminate sentence ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, recognizing the two mitigating circumstances and the absence of any aggravating circumstance.
The decision also emphasized the need to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law appropriately, noting that the initial sentence for murder was incompatible with the evidentiary findings.

Was the trial court’s ambiguous order an approval for the withdrawal of the accused’s motion to change his plea or a substitution of his plea from guilty to not guilty?
What is the legal bearing of the ambiguity regarding the change of plea, especially when the plea for a lesser offense was allowed after the prosecution had rested its case?

Given that Wilson Parohinog was initially accused of murder, does the evidence sufficiently sustain such a conviction, or does it only support the lesser offense of homicide?
How does the presence of mitigating circumstances (plea of guilty and voluntary surrender) impact the appropriate charge and sentencing when the evidence indicates homicide rather than murder?