G.R. No. 46728 - People vs. Montenegro

The case involves the People of the Philippines (plaintiff/appellant) versus Eduardo Montenegro (defendant/appellee).
The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros with a violation of section 114, Title 38, of the United States Code Annotated.

The offense arose when Eduardo Montenegro collected a sum of $700 (equivalent to P1,400) from Valentina Calugcugan in or about September 1932 in the municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros.
The collection was made under the pretext that he was acting as attorney or agent in filing and prosecuting a pension claim for Calugcugan, related to the death of her husband, Lorenzo Yrad, a soldier in the Philippine Scouts.
It was alleged that the fee collected exceeded the permissible compensation under the statute, as the law limited the fee to $10 unless an agreement was duly filed.

The original information was filed before the justice of the peace in Dumaguete, with the accused interposing a demurrer and filing a motion for dismissal.

The demurrer was based on the contention that Philippine courts had no jurisdiction over an offense defined by a United States statute.
The motion for dismissal was premised on the argument that the offense had already prescribed.

Both the demurrer and the motion for dismissal were overruled initially, leading to subsequent proceedings.
The fiscal later sought to amend the information to list the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff instead of the Government of the United States.
Subsequently, when the case was called for trial, the accused requested that his earlier demurrer and motion for dismissal be treated as reproduced.
The Court of First Instance:

Overruled the demurrer.
Sustained the motion for dismissal on the ground that the offense had prescribed.

The motion for reconsideration by the fiscal was denied, prompting the present appeal.

Sets the limits for attorney or agent fees in pension claims, mandating a fee of $10 unless an agreement is properly filed.
Specifies penalties (a fine or imprisonment) for any person receiving or retaining a fee in excess of this statutory amount.

Provides that no person shall be prosecuted for a non-capital offense unless the indictment or information is instituted within three years from the commission of the offense.

Contains rules on prescription for violations penalized by special acts passed by the Philippine Legislature, prescribing an eight-year limitation for offenses punishable by imprisonment of two years or more but less than six years.

The fiscal argued that the statute of limitations (prescription) in Act No. 3763 should apply, which would mandate that the case be tried on its merits since the eight-year period had not elapsed.
The accused contended that Section 582, Title 18 of the United States Code Annotated should govern, thereby concluding that the offense had prescribed.
The core issue was which statutory provision should be deemed applicable for determining the prescription of the offense charged.

Whether the prescription for the offense should be governed by Section 582, Title 18, of the United States Code Annotated, which generally applies to non-capital crimes.
Or whether the limits prescribed in section 1(c) of Act No. 3763, applicable to violations by special acts of the Philippine Legislature, should instead be enforced.

Whether Philippine courts could exercise jurisdiction over an offense defined by a United States statute given the political and legal status during the time in question.
Whether the dismissal of the information by the Court of First Instance for being prescribed was legally tenable.