G.R. No. L-45772 - People vs. Montenegro

The case involves a petition for certiorari with a preliminary injunction/restraining order filed by the People of the Philippines.
The petition challenges the respondent court's orders denying (a) a Motion to Admit Amended Information (dated 10 February 1977) and (b) the accompanying Motion for Reconsideration (dated 22 February 1977).
On 21 March 1977, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent court from hearing or deciding the case until further orders.

On 20 September 1976, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, through Assistant Fiscal Virginia G. Valdez, filed an Information for “Robbery” before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV-B, Quezon City (Criminal Case No. Q-6821).
The Information charged Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig, and Avelino de Leon – all police officers of Quezon City – as accessories-after-the-fact.
The underlying robbery was committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded guilty and been convicted in a separate juvenile case (Criminal Case No. QF-76-051) for robbing items belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc., valued at P75,591.40.
A detailed list of the items involved in the robbery was enumerated in the original Information including, among others, a revolver, various rings, bracelets, pendants, ID plates, and other jewelry.

During arraignment on 25 October 1976, all accused (private respondents) entered a plea of “not guilty” to the charge filed in the original Information.

Before trial proceedings began, the prosecuting fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information on 28 December 1976.
The proposed amendments included:

Changing the charge from “Robbery” (punishable under Article 209 of the Revised Penal Code) to “Robbery in an Uninhabited Place” (punishable under Article 302, which carries a higher penalty).
Alleging a conspiracy among all accused.
Deleting the original detailed list of stolen items and substituting it with an entirely different list of articles valued at P71,336.80.

ID plates (in different designs and calculated values)
Pendants, bracelets, chains, and rings with detailed descriptions and individual prices, including high-value loose diamonds and cameras.

The respondent court denied the Motion to Admit the Amended Information (order dated 10 February 1977).
Upon the petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration, the respondent court reaffirmed its stance by denying the motion (order dated 22 February 1977).
In light of these developments, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 21 March 1977 pending further orders.

Under Section 14 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly Section 13, Rule 110), an amendment to an Information may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea.
Amendments during the trial can be permitted only on matters of form, provided no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused.
The test for prejudice considers whether a defense available under the original complaint would be rendered inapplicable by the amendment and whether the accused’s evidence would be inapplicable.
The proposed amendments were substantial in nature, effectively changing the character of the offense and imposing a higher penalty while introducing new elements such as conspiracy, thereby prejudicing the accused’s right to prepare an adequate defense.
The case cites the People v. Zulueta decision, highlighting that such substantial amendments could radically alter the defense strategy and grant the prosecution an undue tactical advantage.

Whether the proposed amendment to the Information is permissible under the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Does the amendment qualify as a mere change in form, or is it a substantial change that would prejudice the accused?

Whether changing the charge from “Robbery” to “Robbery in an Uninhabited Place” is justified, considering the accused had already pleaded “not guilty” to the original information.

What impact does the change in the nature of the offense have on the penalty and the accused’s right to a fair defense?

Whether the substitution of the list of stolen items undermines the accused’s ability to confront and prepare for the charges against them.

Does the alteration brought about a material change in the allegations that would affect the available defense strategy?

Whether the inclusion of a new allegation of conspiracy – not present in the original complaint – amounts to an undue expansion of the prosecution’s case against the accused.

Does alleging conspiracy expose the accused to additional liabilities and tactics inconsistent with the original charge?