G.R. No. 190112 - Co Sr. vs. The Philippine Canine Club, Inc.

The case involves accused-appellant Roland J. Molina, who was charged with attempted rape and four counts of incestuous rape.
The offenses were committed against his 16‐year‑old daughter, Brenda Molina.
The four counts of incestuous rape allegedly occurred on different dates in 1998 (sometime in August, 22 September, 29 September, and 24 December), while the attempted rape allegedly took place on 1 March 1999.

Following the verbal complaint of his daughter, Brenda, accused-appellant was arrested on 3 March 1999 and detained in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
A regular preliminary investigation was conducted despite the absence of a waiver under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and the findings were affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor.
Accused-appellant did not file any counter-affidavit to dispute the charges.

Four separate Informations were filed for incestuous rape (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 99-02817-D to 99-02820-D) and one for attempted rape (Crim. Case No. 99-02821-D); the cases were raffled to RTC-Br. 42 in Dagupan City, Pangasinan.
Initially, the accused pleaded not guilty to all charges.
During the pre‑trial, it was noted that two of the Informations were amended to specify the dates of commission of the crimes.
On 2 September 1999, during the reset of the trial, accused-appellant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty on all five counts, stating that he was "being bothered by his conscience" and wished "to make amends."
The trial court, after noting the change of plea and the explanation provided by counsel and the public prosecutor, accepted the plea despite ambiguities in the record concerning the procedure followed.

Testimonies of Brenda Molina (the offended party), her mother, police investigators, a barangay councilor, and a medico‑legal officer.
Documentary evidence such as Brenda’s birth certificate, a medico‑legal certificate, and an alleged handwritten letter from the accused to his daughter in which he pleaded for forgiveness.

The defense cross‑examined the prosecution witnesses but did not introduce any evidence in favor of the accused.

The re‑arraignment process was criticized for failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), and Sec. 3 of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:

The accused was not furnished with a copy of the complaint or the list of witnesses in a language or dialect he understood.
The record is silent on any thorough explanation regarding the consequences of his guilty plea.
The Certificate of Re‑Arraignment was inconsistent, referring in the singular to the “complaint” despite the presence of five separate charges.

No transcripts or stenographic notes were produced to verify the details of the plea colloquy and re‑arraignment.
The defense counsel failed to effectively challenge procedural lapses, which later raised issues of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Additional concerns involved the warrantless arrest of the accused, which was executed without the requisite waiver and outside any emergency circumstance as prescribed by law.

Whether the accused-appellant’s change of plea from not guilty to guilty complied with the mandatory procedural requirements under Sec. 1, par. (a) and Sec. 3 of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Whether the absence of proper re‑arraignment procedures (including the lack of provision of a copy of the complaint and the list of witnesses in a language known to the accused) vitiates the validity of the guilty plea.
Whether the failure to conduct a proper and complete searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the guilty plea sufficiently undermines the fairness of the trial.
Whether the procedural irregularities, including the deficiencies in the documentation (e.g., missing transcript of the plea colloquy) and the introduction of unauthenticated evidence (the ambiguous handwritten letter), warrant setting aside the judgment.
Whether the ineffective assistance of counsel, as evidenced by the defense’s failure to adequately challenge these procedural lapses, constitutes a constitutional violation affecting the outcome of the trial.