G.R. No. 46432 - People vs. Martin

The appellant, Teodorico Martin, was originally convicted in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the crime of abduction.
He was sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, which he began serving on January 17, 1917.
On February 5, 1923, after serving eight years, one month, and seventeen days (leaving unserved six years, six months, and fourteen days), he was pardoned on condition that he should not again be found guilty of any crime punishable under Philippine law.

After the pardon, the appellant committed the crime of attempted robbery in band with physical injuries.
He was tried and, by a final judgment dated October 27, 1932, sentenced to pay a fine of 330 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The offense for which he was tried is separate from the original crime of abduction; the new offense is characterized as a distinct crime under the law.

The appellant is charged with violating the conditions of his pardon, in that he committed a crime (attempted robbery) for which he had been conditionally pardoned.
The specific issue is whether the violation specifically triggers the imposition of the remitted sentence, which was six years, six months, and fourteen days of reclusion temporal.

The appellant contended that the proper court to take cognizance of the violation was the Court of First Instance of Cavite (the original sentencing court) instead of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The contention rested on the fact that the original penalty was imposed by the Cavite court, despite the subsequent violation of pardon conditions occurring in Rizal.
The court held that despite the original sentencing venue, the subsequent proceeding is independent, as the violation occurred in Rizal.

The appellant argued that the violation—or the imposition of the remitted penalty—should prescribe after four years under Section 1 of Act No. 3585.
He asserted that since the applicable penalty was prision correccional in its minimum period (which, in his view, when computed with the allowance under article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, would fall within the four-year prescription period), the charge was time-barred.
The court, however, examined that the remitted penalty was in fact more than six years (six years, six months, and fourteen days), invoking Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
It further noted that under the provisions of Act No. 3585 and Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code (which provides a ten-year prescription period for offenses under the Code), the prescription period applicable was eight or ten years, not four.

Whether the Court of First Instance of Rizal has proper jurisdiction over the violation of pardon conditions, despite the original sentencing being in Cavite.
Whether the subsequent proceeding relating to the violation constitutes a new and independent proceeding.

Whether the penalty for violating the conditions of the pardon—specifically, the remitted penalty of six years, six months, and fourteen days—is subject to a four-year prescription period as claimed by the appellant.
How the prescription should be computed given the nature of the penalty and the provisions of Act No. 3585 and the Revised Penal Code.

Whether the allowance of time provided under Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code for good conduct while serving sentence is applicable when the remitted penalty remains unserved.
The proper interpretation of Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code in context of the conditions of pardon and the subsequent offense.