Title
People vs. Hong Din Chu
Case
G.R. No. L-27830
Decision Date
May 29, 1970
Hong Din Chu accused Mercedes Japco Ong of prostitution, a public crime. Trial court dismissed, citing lack of offended party's signature. Supreme Court reversed, ruling fiscal's signature sufficient for jurisdiction. Case remanded.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 6821)
Expanded Legal Reasoning Model

Facts:

  • Procedural Background
    • On January 22, 1966, Hong Din Chu was charged with grave oral defamation before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Criminal Case No. 81257).
    • The information alleged that on or about November 21, 1965, in Manila, the accused uttered defamatory and slanderous remarks against Mercedes Japco Ong, a married woman of high social standing.
  • Allegations in the Charge
    • The information recited that, with the malicious purpose of impeaching the virtue, honor, character, and reputation of Mercedes Japco Ong, the accused, in the presence of many people, declared:
      • “Your daughter is a prostitute and she is a prostitute because you too are a prostitute.”
    • The statement was alleged to have imputed not only the act of adultery but more specifically, the commission of prostitution, which carries the implication of moral degeneracy and an offense against public morals.
  • Developments in Case Proceedings
    • Hong Din Chu pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on December 28, 1966, and the hearing was postponed multiple times amid attempts by friends of both parties to settle the difference amicably.
    • On April 14, 1967, the accused moved to dismiss or quash the information arguing that, since the defamation charge involved an offense (adultery) that could not be prosecuted de oficio, the case should have been initiated by the offended party rather than by a fiscal.
  • Trial Court Decision and Prosecution’s Appeal
    • On May 8, 1967, the trial court, over the objection of the prosecution, ordered the dismissal of the case, relying on Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court which required the offended party’s complaint for an offense that cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
    • The prosecution appealed the dismissal, contending that the information charged the accused specifically with imputation of the crime of prostitution—a public crime that may be prosecuted de oficio—and that the filing by the Assistant City Fiscal, even without the signature of the offended party, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court.

Issues:

  • The Nature of the Offense Imputed
    • Whether the defamatory remark as alleged in the information specifically imputed the commission of prostitution (a public crime) or the commission of adultery (a private offense requiring the offended party’s complaint).
  • Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
    • Whether the filing of the information by the Assistant City Fiscal without the signature of the offended party was proper, given the nature of the offense alleged in the defamation charge.

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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