G.R. No. 90191-96 - People vs. Furugga

On December 9, 1986, a group of individuals—including Leopoldo Magara, Celso Urtiz, Lucio Magara, Alejandro Magara, Romeo Cordova, and Joseph Ferrer (who was wounded)—went to Froilan Clemente’s ricefield located at Sitanga, Dodan, Aparri, Cagayan.
The victims settled in a nipa hut where they fished, rested, and eventually fell asleep.
During their slumber, a sudden burst of gunfire erupted. Joseph Ferrer, though asleep, heard the shots and later observed events that would become central to the case.

After the gunshots ceased, Ferrer, while pretending to be dead, witnessed individuals approaching the hut.
He observed Eleazer Payongan, Basilio Gomer, and the accused-appellant, Anacleto Furugganan (alias “Boy”), proceeding to confirm that their victims were indeed dead.
During this process, Payongan used a lamp and even struck Ferrer to ensure death, while Gomer was seen handling a small gun, and inconsistencies arose regarding the type of weapons carried by the accused.
Following the confirmation inside the hut, the trio left the scene, leaving Ferrer—the sole survivor—to seek help despite his injuries.

In six different informations filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch VIII:

Anacleto Furugganan, along with co-accused Danilo Balao (alias “Ebot”), Eleazer Payongan, Diomedes Palattao, Martin Furugganan, and Basilio Gomer, Jr. were charged with five counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder.
Charges against Danilo Balao were dismissed following an affidavit of retraction by Joseph Ferrer.

Appellant Furugganan, along with Martin Furugganan and Diomedes Palattao initially pleaded not guilty.
The court granted the demurrer to evidence for Martin Furugganan and Diomedes Palattao, leading to their acquittal.
The trial proceeded solely against accused-appellant Anacleto Furugganan, who was found guilty on all counts.

The prosecution hinged its case primarily on the testimony of the lone survivor, Joseph Ferrer.

Ferrer’s account included inconsistent details: while he claimed to have heard the gunshots while in deep sleep, he also testified that he could clearly see the accused-appellant and his companions ascending the hut.
His identification of the accused varied between different examinations and statements (including an alleged ante mortem statement and an extrajudicial statement).

He admitted being present during the incident.
He consistently claimed that he was compelled by an armed threat from Eleazer Payongan to go up the hut, asserting that he was unarmed at the time—as corroborated by evidence that he had surrendered his firearm days before the incident.

Additional evidence included documentary proofs (receipts and certifications) regarding his disarmament and membership in the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF).

The prosecution and the trial court entertained the theory of conspiracy—that the accused had a common murderous design.
The defense countered that there was no evidence of a preconceived plan or overt acts of cooperation beyond mere companionship and a drinking session prior to the crime.
Other factual circumstances examined included:

The fact that the accused-appellant was present at the scene does not automatically establish a conspiracy.
The absence of direct evidence of his participation in shooting, given that the fatal shots were fired by his co-accused.

Whether the lone survivor’s testimony, with its irreconcilable inconsistencies, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
If the apparent contradictions in Ferrer’s statements undermine the moral certainty required in criminal cases.

Whether the facts presented are adequate to support the inference of a preconceived and collective murderous design involving the accused-appellant.
If mere association and presence with co-accused during the incident can be equated with active participation in a conspiracy.

Whether the trial court properly weighed the evidence considering that any doubt should benefit the accused.
If the judgment of conviction was erroneously predicated on the weaknesses of the defense’s evidence rather than the strength of the prosecution’s case.