G.R. No. 237246 - Kho, Sr. vs. Magbanua

The appellant, Valeriano Ducosin, was charged with the crime of frustrated murder.
The offense occurred on or about September 23, 1932, in Manila, Philippine Islands.
The charge stemmed from Ducosin’s alleged willful, treacherous, and felonious attack on Rafael Yanguas involving a stabbing with a knife.
Although the stabbing inflicted several wounds, some of which were of a potentially mortal nature, the timely intervention of medical assistance prevented death.

Ducosin was tried on September 30, 1932, for the frustrated murder of Yanguas based on the criminal information filed.
On arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty to all the acts constituting the crime.
The plea of guilty served as an extenuating circumstance, leading to the imposition of a sentence within the minimum statutory range.
He was sentenced to ten years and one day of prision mayor, along with accessory penalties and payment of costs, in accordance with the Revised Penal Code provisions governing frustrated felonies.

The case was revisited after the enactment of Act No. 4103 on December 5, 1933, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Act No. 4103 requires courts to fix two terms when sentencing:

A “maximum” penalty that aligns with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
A “minimum” imprisonment period, which serves as the basis for parole eligibility once served.

The rules for determining the minimum and maximum imprisonment periods.
The establishment of a Board of Indeterminate Sentence to review prisoner records and grant parole.
Conditions and surveillance measures applicable after release on parole.

The primary judicial issue was to revise the sentence imposed on Ducosin to be in conformity with the newly enacted Indeterminate Sentence Law.
This revision involved determining:

How to assess the “maximum” penalty under the unchanged rules of the Revised Penal Code.
How to calculate the “minimum” imprisonment period based on the “penalty next lower” to that prescribed for the offense.

The challenge lay in applying the broad discretionary powers granted by Act No. 4103 to determine the appropriate minimum term within the permissible range.

Should the maximum penalty remain fixed in accordance with the rules of the Revised Penal Code despite the enactment of Act No. 4103?
How does the requirement to impose a dual penalty (maximum and minimum) affect the established sentence?

How is “the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code” to be construed in terms of determining the minimum imprisonment period?
What factors should guide the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the allowed range?

To what extent does Act No. 4103 grant the court a wider discretion in individualizing the minimum sentence based on the offender’s personal circumstances and societal considerations?
How should the balancing of rehabilitation and public safety influence the determination of the minimum term?

Reconciliation Between the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law

How does the court harmonize the sentencing provisions of the Revised Penal Code with the new operative requirements of Act No. 4103?
What is the legislative intent behind introducing the indeterminate sentencing system, and how should that intent be given effect in this case?