G.R. No. 230299 - Penalosa vs. Ocampo, Jr.

In October 1998 in Caloocan City, appellant Josefina M. Dimalanta and complainant Elvira D. Abarca entered into a transaction involving jewelry.
Appellant was allegedly employed at the Caloocan City Engineering Office and was involved in the sale or resale of jewelry.
Complainant delivered assorted jewelry pieces, which were to be sold by appellant through a third party, Levinia Maranan.

Appellant issued a series of twelve postdated checks to pay for the jewelry purchased or, as claimed by the defense, for the proceeds of the resale agreement.
The transaction outlined in the charging document stated that appellant represented having sufficient funds while issuing the checks.
The first check was honored; however, the remaining eleven checks were dishonored owing to appellant’s bank account being closed.
A letter was sent on May 28, 1999, followed by a registered mail notice on June 7, 1999, demanding payment, which appellant failed to satisfy within the prescribed period.

Appellant was charged on November 10, 1999, with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818 and further by Republic Act No. 4885.
On January 24, 2000, appellant was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.
The trial court convicted appellant of Estafa and imposed the penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua along with civil liability amounting to P383,826.00.

Prosecution’s evidence focused on the issuance of the postdated checks, the fact that they were not sufficiently funded, and the dishonor from the bank due to a closed account.
The defense contended that:

The transaction was not a direct purchase by appellant for her personal use but rather operated on a resale agreement.
The checks were intended as payment for preexisting obligations arising from the resale of the jewelry, not as a means of committing fraud.
Appellant’s actions, including her efforts to partially remedy the situation by paying P25,000.00, were in good faith.

Complainant’s own testimony evidenced that there was an agreement indicating the jewelry were given to appellant for resale, thereby underlining that the checks were not the cause of defrauding but were merely instruments in a prearranged business arrangement.

Levinia Maranan was involved as the intermediary responsible for selling the jewelry.
Maranan initially funded the first check but later experienced financial difficulties and went into hiding, which contributed to the mishandling of subsequent payments.

On appeal, appellant challenged the trial court’s findings on three main grounds:

The Office of the Solicitor General recommended a judgment of acquittal, highlighting the lack of genuine deceit on the part of appellant.

Whether the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant employed deceit in issuing the postdated checks.
Whether the issuance of checks—allegedly intended to cover a pre-existing obligation under a resale agreement—constituted the fraud required under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether the defense’s proof of good faith, including appellant’s effort to effect partial payment and reliance on third-party funding for the checks, rebutted the prima facie presumption of deceit.
Whether the proper application of legal principles on mens rea and the presumption of innocence required acquittal despite the dishonor of the checks.
Whether Levinia Maranan, as the party responsible for the proceeds of the sale, should be impleaded for the determination of civil liability.