G.R. No. 264260 - Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary Lucas P. Bersamin, et al.

The case originated from the Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued an order on September 18, 1963, denying the motion of the accused to lift the court’s order confiscating her bail bond.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.—the bondsman—was likewise denied later on the same day.
The bondsman had posted a bail bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to secure the provisional liberty of the accused, Isabel del Carmen y Pabalan, who had previously appealed her conviction for theft to the Court of First Instance.

The accused failed to appear on September 6, 1963, the day scheduled for trial.
As a result of the absence of the accused, the court a quo issued an order stating:

For failure to appear notwithstanding due notice, the bond filed for her temporary liberty would be confiscated.
The bondsman was ordered to produce the accused within thirty (30) days and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the full bond amount.

On the very same day (September 6, 1963), the accused, with the knowledge and conformity of her bondsman, filed a “Motion to Lift Order of Arrest and Confiscation of Bond,” attributing her nonappearance to a delay caused by a fire in Folgueras Street, Tondo, Manila.
The aforementioned motion was denied on September 7, 1963, due to the movant’s lack of proper personality.

On September 18, 1963, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused, again with the bondsman’s approval.
The court denied the motion for reconsideration on the same day, noting that, in view of the accused’s surrender, the forfeiture was reduced to 20% of the bond, thereby rendering the bondsman liable for that percentage.
The bondsman, contesting the order on reconsideration, moved for further relief, which eventually led to the present appeal.

Whether the court had the authority to render judgment on the bond before the expiration of the thirty (30) day period provided for the bondsman to produce the defendant and show cause, as stipulated in Section 15.
The appellant contended that since the order under Section 15 was issued on September 6, 1963, the court should have waited until the 30-day period lapsed before rendering judgment.

Whether the explanation submitted by the bondsman regarding the accused’s nonappearance (attributed to the delay caused by a fire) was satisfactory enough to warrant a postponement of judgment on the bond.
This issue involves the discretionary power of the trial court to evaluate the merits of the bondsman’s explanation under existing jurisprudence.