G.R. No. 33094 - People vs. Daylo

Primitivo Daylo, the defendant and appellant, was charged with the crime of estafa in seventeen informations.
The seventeen informations were divided as follows:

Four informations before the Court of First Instance of Leyte (case Nos. 8087, 8156, 8231, and 8232).
Thirteen informations before the justice of the peace of Burawen (numbered 8090, 8091, 8089, 8143, 8135, 8136, 8187, 8188, 8189, 8190, 8191, 8192, and 8193).

During the pendency of the appeal from the cases tried before the justice of the peace, the provincial fiscal filed three motions on August 26, 1929, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant.
These motions sought the dismissal of the thirteen appealed cases so that three new informations could be presented in their place.
In one motion, information numbered 8087 was reconfigured to include cases 8089, 8090, 8091, 8135, 8136, 8191, and 8193, which had already been tried and were under appeal.

At the trial court, the defendant sought a separate trial for case No. 8087 and pleaded the defense of double jeopardy.
The trial court overruled this defense and proceeded with the trial.
On January 28, 1930, the trial court rendered judgment convicting Daylo of estafa and sentencing him to four years and one day of arresto mayor, in addition to the accessory penalties prescribed by Article 61 of the Penal Code and the costs of the proceedings.

The trial court erred in not sustaining the defense of double jeopardy.
The trial court erred in not acquitting the defendant of the charges filed against him.

The pivotal issue was whether the dismissal of cases (specifically Nos. 8089, 8090, 8091, 8135, 8136, 8191, and 8193) on appeal from the justice of the peace to the Court of First Instance constitutes a bar to the prosecution in criminal case No. 8087.
The contention was that merging previously tried cases into the single trial of case No. 8087 effectively places the defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense.

The case referenced United States vs. Ballentine (4 Phil., 672), which enumerated five requisites for establishing jeopardy in the Philippine Islands.
The decision also cited United States vs. Walsh (6 Phil., 349) for the principle that subjecting a defendant to a second trial for the same offense results in double jeopardy.

Whether the dismissal of the justice-of-peace cases (Nos. 8089, 8090, 8091, 8135, 8136, 8191, and 8193) on appeal constitutes an acquittal of the defendant for those matters.
Whether the subsequent filing and trial of an information (No. 8087) that incorporates the dismissed cases exposes the defendant to double jeopardy by subjecting him to trial twice for the same offense.
Whether the merger of previously tried cases into one new trial, despite an earlier dismissal on appeal, violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.