G.R. No. 48421 - People vs. Besa

The defendant, Victorio Besa, had faced an earlier criminal case where he pleaded guilty to less serious physical injuries.
His case was prosecuted based on a valid complaint filed and handled by a justice of the peace court, an institution with proper jurisdiction over such offenses.

Despite the conviction for less serious physical injuries, the state initiated a separate prosecution charging the defendant with attempted murder.
The offense of attempted murder is considered a greater crime that necessarily includes the elements of the lesser offense for which the defendant had already been convicted.

The case raises key questions under criminal law and procedure, particularly concerning the doctrine of double jeopardy.
Statutory provisions at issue include Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and Section 26 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure.
The central contention is whether the double jeopardy principle bars the second prosecution even though the accused had already been convicted of an offense that is inherently part of the greater charge.

The court reviewed pertinent precedents and doctrines from cases such as Grafton vs. United States, Commonwealth vs. Roby, United States vs. Lim Suco, People vs. Martinez, and People vs. Cox.
These cases articulate that when the evidence supporting a conviction for a lesser offense would also prove a more serious offense, the accused is considered to be facing double jeopardy.
The jurisprudence reinforces the principle that once the state elects to prosecute one facet of a composite criminal act, it implicitly waives the right to pursue the prosecution of the other facet.

Whether the subsequent prosecution for attempted murder violates the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
How the principle that an offense necessarily includes its lesser components applies in this case.

Whether the interpretation and application of Section 9 of Rule 113, which bars a subsequent prosecution when the second offense necessarily includes the first, amounts to an unconstitutional modification of Section 26 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure.
The issue involves reconciling the literal wording of the statutes with their intended protective purpose against multiple prosecutions for the same act.

Whether the evidence that led to the conviction for less serious physical injuries would suffice to establish the greater offense of attempted murder.
Determining if prosecutorial actions are justified when the facts of the case satisfy the test that one crime is inherently contained within another, regardless of jurisdictional nuances.