G.R. No. L-32792 - People vs. Bastasa

In Criminal Case No. 4609 before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, spouses Dionisio Bastasa and Virginia Bastasa were charged with the crime of murder.
The victim, Atty. Solomon Sudiacal, was fatally shot on the evening of December 2, 1966, in Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte.
The prosecution alleged that the accused, acting in concert and with treachery and evident premeditation, shot the victim multiple times, one of which was immediately fatal.

According to the factual narrative, on December 2, 1966, Atty. Sudiacal visited the residence of the Bastasa spouses on Jones Street, Dipolog, to inquire about a cigarette order.
Upon his arrival, while he was seated in the sala and perusing a fashion magazine, the appellant fired shots at him from the balcony.
Witnesses, including Francisco Balboza, Jr. and his companion, confirmed that they heard and later saw the sequence of events, notably:

Shots being fired and the victim sustaining multiple gunshot wounds.
The subsequent removal and handling of the victim’s body by the Bastasa spouses.

Physical evidence included empty bullet shells, bullet holes on various items (the victim’s jacket, fashion magazines, and the absence of bullet holes on the victim’s T-shirt), all corroborating the events as testified.

The appellant, Dionisio Bastasa, admitted to shooting the deceased but offered a version that differed in key aspects from that of the prosecution:

He stated that he had returned from Zamboanga City after running an errand and, upon arriving home via a secret passage, discovered a jacket and a loaded .45 caliber pistol on a table.
Ascending a ladder to inspect the situation, he observed the victim, naked from the waist, in the bedroom with his wife, Virginia Bastasa.
Claiming surprise and a sense of betrayal, he contended that an altercation ensued in which he fired four shots, followed by additional shots as the victim fled to the kitchen.
After the incident, he attempted to manipulate the scene by overturning the body and later surrendered to the authorities at the PC Headquarters in Sicayab, Dipolog.

The physical evidence, such as the bullet shells and bullet holes on household items, was used to test the credibility of his account.

Both accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on February 17, 1967, and the trial proceeded with the presentation of conflicting evidence from the prosecution and defense.
On July 16, 1970, the trial court rendered its decision:

It found Dionisio Bastasa guilty of murder as the principal offender, noting the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation partially mitigated by his voluntary surrender.
It sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with accessory civil indemnifications, while Virginia Bastasa was acquitted as accessory-after-the-fact, largely due to her status as his spouse.

The appellant, dissatisfied with the decision, raised the issue of the inapplicability of the imposed penalty, arguing that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code—which provides for the penalty of destierro in specific circumstances—was not properly applied.

At the time of trial and subsequent appeals, Dionisio Bastasa had been under preventive imprisonment since December 2, 1966—a period amounting to nearly twelve years.
A key point of contention was whether the credit for preventive detention under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code could extend to the penalty of destierro, which, although not technically imprisonment, constitutes a form of deprivation of liberty.
The Solicitor General’s evidence and analysis leaned towards accepting the appellant’s version as more credible in light of the physical facts and timelines, emphasizing that the killing occurred in the context of illicit marital relations.

Whether the trial court erred by not applying Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code in imposing a penalty for the crime committed.

Specifically, whether killing a person caught in the act of committing adultery constitutes grounds for the penalty of destierro under Article 247.
Whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the victim's presence in the accused's house was linked to an illicit sexual encounter with the appellant’s wife.

Whether the credit for preventive detention under Article 29 applies when the penalty imposed is destierro.

Given that destierro, although not traditional imprisonment, still results in deprivation of liberty, should the already-served preventive detention period be deducted from the imposed sentence?
How the credited time might affect the net punitive consequence relative to the statutory duration of destierro (from six months and one day to six years).