G.R. No. 129433 - People vs. Campuhan

On October 7, 2002, at 12:30 in the morning, respondent Jaime Abordo was riding his motorcycle when he encountered three private complainants: Kennard Majait, Joeniel Calvez, and Jose Montes.
An altercation ensued between Abordo and the complainants.
During the confrontation, Abordo shot Majait in the leg and Calvez in the lower left side of his abdomen, while Montes escaped unhurt.

Abordo was charged with two counts of attempted murder (Criminal Case Nos. N-2212 and N-2213) and one count of frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. N-2211) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biliran Province, Branch 16.
The trial court, in its August 29, 2005 Decision, found no treachery or evident premeditation, hence holding Abordo liable for:

The trial court also recognized four generic mitigating circumstances in Abordo’s favor.
Abordo was acquitted with respect to the complaint filed by Montes.

All three complainants moved for reconsideration regarding the civil aspect of the case and filed a supplemental motion for moral damages.
Calvez originally filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and criminal aspects, but later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration and its supplement.
On October 24, 2005, the RTC dismissed Majait’s motion for reconsideration and granted the withdrawal of Calvez’s motion, simultaneously dismissing Calvez’s appeal for lacking the necessary conformity with the Provincial Prosecutor.

Acting on an indorsed letter from the Assistant City Prosecutor, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The petition alleged that:

The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion (amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction) by finding that Abordo had no intent to kill, thereby convicting him only for lesser crimes rather than for frustrated or attempted murder.
The trial court improperly appreciated mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo.

The CA dismissed the petition outright on the grounds that the remedy sought was inappropriate since, in questioning the trial court’s findings, an appeal was the proper recourse—not a petition for certiorari—which would also risk placing the accused in double jeopardy.

Dissatisfied with the CA’s dismissal, the OSG subsequently filed a petition for review under Rule 45.
The petition for review asserted that:

The CA had erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari as the wrong remedy.
The errors alleged by the OSG were grave and amounted to a jurisdictional error, thereby justifying the use of certiorari despite the standard constraints regarding review of evidentiary findings.

The appellate discussion further referenced pertinent cases—such as People v. Uy, People v. Laguio, Jr., and People v. Tria-Tirona—that delimited the proper scope of certiorari versus appeal.
Ultimately, while the CA’s resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari as the wrong remedy was set aside, the petition for certiorari itself was denied for lack of merit.

Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question a trial court’s judgment that acquitted Abordo on one count and reduced the charges on the others, especially when the remedy might expose the accused to double jeopardy.
Whether the alleged errors in the trial court’s evidentiary assessment and the appreciation of mitigating circumstances constitute jurisdictional errors justifying certiorari.

Whether an appellate court can review the trial court’s evaluation of evidence via certiorari when the alleged mistakes are essentially errors of judgment.
Whether correcting such errors through a petition for certiorari would contravene the finality-of-acquittal doctrine and the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Whether the trial court’s findings—in particular, its conclusion that Abordo displayed no intent to kill and had his charges mitigated—amounted to grave abuse of discretion, thus constituting a lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether the trial court’s proper exercise of discretion in evaluating evidence precludes reversal through an extraordinary remedy like certiorari.