G.R. No. 35066 - People vs. Almonte

The accused, Purificacion Almonte, had been living maritally with the Chinaman Felix Te Sue.
A week before the incident, due to a dispute involving another woman, Miguela Dawal, with whom Te Sue had also lived maritally, the parties agreed to separate.
After the separation, Felix Te Sue began living in Guinlajon, Sorsogon, with Miguela Dawal.

On the morning of October 1, 1930, the accused visited her former paramour, Felix Te Sue.
Upon entering his residence and finding him with Miguela Dawal, Te Sue requested that she leave, warning that the presence of her new companion might provoke jealousy.
Feeling unjustly treated after being pushed by both Te Sue and Miguela, the accused, in a fit of passion, retrieved a small penknife and stabbed Te Sue in the abdomen.
After committing the act, the accused fled the scene—leaving the knife embedded in the victim’s body—and subsequently took a bus home.

Felix Te Sue was immediately transported to Sorsogon Provincial Hospital, where he received first aid.
Doctor Eduardo Ortega conducted a minor operation that involved cleaning, medicating, and suturing the abdominal wound, which was described as shallow, involving only muscle tissue.
Despite being admonished to remain bedbound to avoid aggravating his condition, Te Sue exhibited nervous and restless behavior, moving about the room.
The movements of the patient—such as shifting position, sitting up, and walking—were perceived by Doctor Ortega as “unnecessary” and responsible for increasing congestion in the already affected internal veins.
As a consequence of such movements, a secondary internal hemorrhage developed, which ultimately led to Te Sue’s death on the sixth day after hospitalization.

Doctor Ortega testified that the wound sustained was not deep enough to cause an immediate hemorrhage and should have healed within a week if proper rest had been maintained.
The testimony clarified that the injury, produced by the blow of a small, not very sharp penknife, generated a congestion in the internal vessels.
The doctor detailed that the victim’s subsequent movements against medical advice were the proximate cause of the secondary hemorrhage.
Additional evidence noted that the victim was in a nervous state from the moment he arrived at the hospital, a condition attributed to the inflicted wound.

Purificacion Almonte was charged with homicide, with the information specifying that her act caused the death of Felix Te Sue.
At trial, the accused pleaded not guilty, but was convicted and originally sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, along with the obligation to indemnify the heirs of the deceased.
On appeal, the defense presented multiple assignments of error based on:

The attribution of the victim’s unnecessary movements solely to pain from the wound.
Holding the accused criminally responsible for the secondary hemorrhage.
Classifying the act as homicide rather than slight physical injuries.

The defense argued that the victim’s own actions (seeking comfort due to the warmth of the bed and unfamiliarity with it) were the cause of his aggravated condition rather than the wound per se.

Whether the unnecessary movements of the victim, allegedly caused by his discomfort or nervous condition, should be considered sufficient to establish that the wound was the proximate cause of death.
Whether the secondary hemorrhage can be attributed directly to the action of the accused, given the intervening behavior of the victim while under medical care.

Whether the accused should be held criminally responsible for homicide (a grave offense) or for less serious physical injuries, considering the wound was minor and might have healed if not for the additional movements.
Whether the victim’s own negligence—or his physiological reaction to the wound—should mitigate the accused’s criminal responsibility.

The trial judge’s determination that the victim’s movements were caused by the pain from the wound and were directly responsible for causing a secondary hemorrhage.
The assignment of error regarding the conviction of homicide instead of a lesser offense, as argued by the defense.