Title
Pendon vs. Diasnes
Case
G.R. No. L-5606
Decision Date
Aug 28, 1952
Simplicio Pendon challenged Julito Diasnes' mayoral eligibility due to a 1932 estafa conviction. Diasnes claimed a 1934 pardon, supported by secondary evidence after wartime record destruction. The Supreme Court ruled the pardon valid, restoring his political rights and affirming his eligibility.
A

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-5606)

Facts:

  • Background of the Case
    • Simplicio Pendon, the petitioner and appellant, instituted a warranto proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
    • The purpose was to declare Julito Diasnes, the respondent and municipal mayor-elect of Dumangas, Iloilo (elected on November 13, 1951), ineligible due to a previous criminal conviction.
  • Prior Criminal Conviction and Imprisonment
    • Julito Diasnes was convicted of estafa in 1932.
    • He was sentenced to one year and one day of imprisonment.
    • The sentence was fully extinguished, having been partially served in the provincial jail of Iloilo and partly in Bilibid Prison, with his release on September 25, 1933.
  • The Pardon Contention and Evidence
    • The defendant asserted that he was granted an absolute pardon by the Governor General in 1934.
    • The original pardon, along with its copies, was unavailable because:
      • They were destroyed or lost during the last war.
      • The defendant testified that the original was burned along with his house during the Japanese occupation.
    • To prove the unavailability, the defendant introduced secondary evidence including:
      • Deposition of Atty. Honorato B. Masakayan, Executive Officer and Secretary of the Board of Pardon and Parole, stating that all records were destroyed in the last war.
      • Deposition of Emilio Punzal, Chief of the Records Division of the Office of the President, testifying similarly about the destruction of records.
      • Deposition of Jose M. Abrigo, Identification Clerk and Custodian of the Records of the Bureau of Prisons, indicating that no record was found though he explained that copies of pardons were not always furnished to the prison authorities.
      • Certificate and testimony by the Clerk of Court of Iloilo, noting the destruction of all pre-war records.
      • Certificate by the Director of Civil Service confirming that records were lost or destroyed during the last Pacific War.
  • Voting Qualifications and Legislative Provisions
    • The case also involved interpretation of Section 99 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended by Republic Act No. 599, concerning voter disqualification.
    • Under section 99, persons convicted of crimes and sentenced to imprisonment of one year or longer may be disqualified from voting unless pardoned.
    • The petitioner contended that pardon does not remove the incapacity or disqualification as a voter in cases of convictions for crimes against property.
  • Prior Jurisprudence Referenced
    • The case of Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, was cited, where:
      • The court held that an absolute pardon “blots out the crime committed” and removes all consequent disabilities, including the disqualification from voting.
      • It reinforced that when pardon is granted after the expiration of the imposed sentence, the political rights of the individual should be fully restored.

Issues:

  • Admissibility and Sufficiency of Secondary Evidence
    • Whether the secondary evidence submitted (depositions, certificates, and testimonies) was admissible and sufficient to prove the existence, nature, and contents of the alleged pardon.
  • Effect of Executive Clemency on Disqualification
    • Whether an absolute pardon, as evidenced by secondary proofs, removes the disqualification from voting imposed by Section 99 of Republic Act No. 180 regardless of the crime’s nature, including crimes against property.
  • Interpretation of Legislative Provisions
    • Whether paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 99 should be read together so that pardon fully restores the political rights of persons convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of one year or more.
    • The implication of interpreting paragraph (b) as excluding the restorative effect of pardon on convictions for crimes against property, and whether such interpretation would lead to absurd consequences.

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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