G.R. No. 140931 - Balite vs. Court of Appeals

Romulo F. Pecson (petitioner) and Lyndon A. Cunanan (respondent) were candidates for the mayoralty position in Magalang, Pampanga during the May 2007 elections.
Cunanan was initially proclaimed the winner with 12,592 votes against Pecson’s 12,531 votes, a margin of 61 votes.
Following the proclamation, Pecson promptly filed an election protest challenging the vote tally and the legitimacy of Cunanan’s victory.

Pecson’s protest, docketed as EPE No. 07-51, was heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56 in Angeles City.
On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Pecson, finding that he obtained 14,897 votes against Cunanan’s 13,758 votes, thereby awarding Pecson a margin of 1,139 votes.
Cunanan received a copy of the RTC Decision on November 26, 2007 and subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal.

On November 28, 2007, Pecson filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, invoking Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests.
The RTC granted this motion through a Special Order dated December 3, 2007, which authorized execution pending appeal but suspended the issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days.
The Special Order emphasized:

A clear demonstration of Pecson’s victory, reflective of the voter mandate.
The principle of giving due recognition to the trial court’s decision akin to the initial proclamation of the board of canvassers.
The overriding public interest in averting a hollow or pyrrhic victory, particularly given the tendency for delays in election protest adjudication.

Arguing that the RTC abused its discretion by issuing a writ of execution pending appeal despite the transmission of the case records and the expiration issues of the appeal period.
Questioning the RTC’s computation of the votes, contending that the numbers exceeded the total votes cast for the mayoralty, thereby casting doubt on whether Pecson’s victory was clearly established.

Cunanan subsequently sought a Preliminary Injunction/TRO from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), compelling the suspension of the writ’s implementation and asserting that the RTC had relinquished jurisdiction upon the transmission of records.
In response, Pecson opposed the TRO, arguing that the petition for a preliminary injunction was an ancillary remedy inconsistent with the substantive 【execution pending appeal】 action, and accused Cunanan of forum shopping.

The RTC to halt any issuance or implementation of the writ of execution pending appeal.
Cunanan to continue functioning as Mayor of Magalang.

Notwithstanding the TRO, the RTC eventually issued a writ of execution on March 11, 2008, enabling Pecson to assume mayoral duties.
On May 21, 2008, the COMELEC en banc reversed the RTC’s Special Order through a Resolution:

It nullified the writ of execution on the basis that the RTC had lost its jurisdiction after the records were transmitted and the appeal period expired.
The en banc ruling emphasized a balancing act between preserving continuity in public service and the right to judicial appeal, hence questioning the RTC’s reliance on the “good and special reasons” cited in the Special Order.

Pecson filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, challenging the COMELEC en banc Resolution and alleging grave abuse of discretion.
He contended that the RTC had correctly determined the prerequisites for execution pending appeal, that the errors in vote calculation were merely clerical and did not affect the overall outcome, and that the COMELEC improperly substituted its own considerations.
The petition centered on the proper interpretation of Section 11, Rule 14 and the need to give full effect to the voter mandate expressed in the RTC Decision despite pending appeals.

Whether the RTC properly exercised its residual jurisdiction by ordering execution pending appeal even though the records were transmitted and the appeal period had not yet definitively lapsed.
Whether the issuance of the writ of execution on March 11, 2008, despite subsequent questioning of the RTC’s authority, was procedurally proper.

Whether the RTC met the requirements of Section 11, Rule 14 by clearly establishing Pecson’s victory and Cunanan’s defeat, despite alleged errors in vote computation.
Whether the computation error, as corrected by the COMELEC Second Division, affected the fundamental finding of a clear victory for Pecson.

Whether the Special Order issued by the RTC, citing superior circumstances such as the voter mandate and public interest considerations, was sufficient to authorize execution pending appeal.
Whether the balancing approach adopted by the COMELEC en banc—emphasizing the existence of “two presumptive winners” and the need for public service continuity—was an appropriate standard.

Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion by basing its nullification of the RTC’s Special Order on factors not contemplated by the Rules.
Whether the use of alternative considerations, such as potential disruption of public service, improperly negated the statutory and judicial basis for execution pending appeal.