G.R. No. 205832 - Palajos vs. Abad

Petitioner: Gorgonio P. Palajos, who claimed prior possession of Lot No. 5 of the subject property based on a purported May 4, 1988 Deed of Absolute Sale, payment of real property taxes, installation of a telephone line, and a COMELEC registration application for his son.
Respondents: Jose Manolo E. Abad and his siblings, Ma. Jasmin E. Abad and Jose Roman E. Abad, who, as plaintiffs in the original forcible entry suit, asserted their prior possession of the subject property, a group of three contiguous parcels (Lot Nos. 5, 7, and 9, Block 73, Pound Street, Phase 8, North Fairview, Quezon City).
The subject property was acquired by the Abad siblings from their parents in 1999, with possession commencing in that year, later evidenced by constructing a concrete perimeter fence around the property in September or October 2001.

On February 25, 2006, the Abad siblings initiated a complaint for forcible entry against Palajos and other defendants in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 38, Civil Case No. 06-35654, alleging that the defendants had unlawfully encroached upon the property by force and stealth.
While the case was pending, a motion to render judgment was filed by the plaintiffs on April 25, 2006. The MeTC, in its June 16, 2006 Order, granted the motion against all defendants except for Palajos whose answer was admitted.
The case narrative revealed that on discovering the unlawful entry and destruction of parts of the perimeter fence in the third week of January 2006, the plaintiffs had demanded that the defendants vacate the property—a demand ignored by the defendants.

The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in its September 21, 2007 Decision, finding that the Abad siblings had established prior physical possession by constructing a concrete fence around the property. The judgment ordered the defendants to vacate the premises and pay monthly rentals and attorney’s fees.
Aggrieved by the MeTC ruling, Palajos appealed, and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the decision on August 28, 2009, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to prove prior actual physical possession.
Unsatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Abad siblings filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (CA). In its September 4, 2012 Decision, the CA reversed the RTC ruling and reinstated the MeTC ruling, finding that Manolo had demonstrated prior physical possession. A subsequent motion for reconsideration by Palajos was denied in the CA’s February 7, 2013 Resolution.

The Abad siblings relied on their acts of possession since 1999, notably the construction of the perimeter fence, as concrete acts reflecting their intent and control over the property.
Palajos presented evidence of payments for real property taxes, telephone billing records from 2004, and a COMELEC registration application from 2003 to assert his claim of prior possession.
However, these evidentiary submissions postdated the Abad siblings’ entry and construction of the fence, thereby weakening Palajos’ assertion of a prior claim.

The controversy also called upon the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court governing ejectment cases, distinguishing between forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
For a successful forcible entry action, the plaintiff must establish (a) prior physical possession of the property before the defendant’s encroachment, (b) deprivation of possession by means such as force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and (c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time of discovery of the deprivation.
The concept of possession in these cases extends beyond mere physical occupation to include acts of will and juridical acts that confer the force of possession.

Whether the respondent, Manolo Abad, sufficiently proved his prior physical possession of the subject property (including Lot No. 5) through juridical acts and material evidence, thereby entitling him to relief in the context of the ejectment suit for forcible entry.

The contention revolves around whether the entry by Palajos was clandestine and if the evidences advanced by each party substantiate their respective claims of possession.
Whether the evidentiary timeline supports that the Abad siblings established possession well before the evidence presented by Palajos.

Whether the CA gravely erred in finding that Palajos had made a clandestine entry despite the alleged absence of evidence and in disregarding the prior possession by Manolo and his siblings.

This issue further involves the proper interpretation of the one-year prescriptive period applicable to a forcible entry suit, particularly when entry is executed by stealth.