G.R. No. L-44627 - Pajarito vs. Seneris

On or about May 9, 1975, in the City of Zamboanga, the defendant, Joselito Aizon, while driving an Isuzu Passenger Bus, allegedly drove recklessly.
The accused’s reckless and fast driving, allegedly without taking proper precautions regarding road conditions (width, traffic, visibility, grades, crossings, and curvatures), caused the bus to turn turtle.
As a consequence, two passengers, Myrna Pajarito de San Luis and Musa Baring, sustained injuries that resulted in their deaths.

Joselito Aizon was charged with Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence under Section 48 of Republic Act No. 4136.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty, which led the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, presided over by Judge Alberto V. Seneris, to render judgment.
The judgment sentenced Aizon to indemnify the heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis with P12,000.00.

After the judgment became final and executory, a Writ of Execution was issued against Joselito Aizon for the indemnity; however, it was returned unsatisfied due to his insolvency.
Petitioner's (Lucia S. Pajarito, the victim’s mother) motion for the issuance of a Subsidiary Writ of Execution was filed against Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of Joselito Aizon.
Felipe Aizon opposed the motion by asserting:

He was not the employer of Joselito Aizon since the bus had allegedly been sold to Isaac Aizon (father of Joselito), though the deed of transfer had not been executed due to non-payment of the full price.
In case of insolvency, the accused should suffer subsidiary imprisonment instead of shifting the liability to his employer.

The lower court denied the motion for a Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the ground that Felipe Aizon, being an alleged party not joined in the criminal case, could not be held liable under the said proceeding.
It was ruled that a separate civil action must be filed to enforce the subsidiary liability of an employer as provided under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner argued that the enforcement of subsidiary liability should be allowed within the same criminal proceeding.
It was contended that respondent Felipe Aizon had been given notice and an opportunity to respond, and thus should be considered as having had his day in court.
Respondents maintained that under the present judicial system, a separate civil action is required because the employer was not originally a party to the criminal action against Joselito Aizon.

The question before the Court was whether the enforcement of subsidiary civil liability (under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code) may be enforced within the same criminal proceeding or whether a separate civil action is necessary.
The Court examined precedents indicating that the criminal action carries an implied civil action unless a separate civil proceeding is instituted.
The Court also noted that the employer’s subsidiary liability becomes conclusive upon the conviction of the employee, provided the employee is insolvent.

Whether enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code can be included within the same criminal proceeding rather than being brought as a separate civil action.
Whether the lower court erred in its ruling by not considering the employer, Felipe Aizon, as effectively a party to the criminal action for purposes of enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability.

Whether the judgment of conviction in the criminal case, which imposed a civil indemnity liability on the employee, automatically extends to include the employer’s subsidiary liability.
Whether the employer’s claim of having sold the bus (thus, not being the employer or the operator at the relevant time) can be litigated and resolved within the same criminal proceeding.

Whether the employer, Felipe Aizon, having been given notice and an opportunity to respond, is effectively in a position to protect his interests in the criminal proceeding.
Whether it is just and efficient to allow all issues, including disputes over vehicle ownership or operation, to be resolved in the same proceedings for the execution of the judgment.