Case Digest (G.R. No. L-17144)
Facts:
Sergio Osmena, Jr. v. Salipada K. Pendatun, et al., G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960, the Supreme Court En Banc, Bengzon, J., writing for the Court.
Petitioner Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr. filed on July 14, 1960 a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, who are the respondents in their capacity as committee members. The petition sought annulment of House Resolution No. 59 and an injunction against the committee's conduct, principally the authority to require Osmena to substantiate charges he made in a June 23, 1960 privilege speech accusing the President of corrupt practices (including sale of pardons and bail). The petition relied on alleged absolute parliamentary immunity for words spoken in the House and invoked House Rule XVII, sec. 7, which petitioner said barred discipline because other business had intervened after his speech.
The Court, though expressing doubts about jurisdiction and cause of action, required respondents to answer and did not issue a preliminary injunction. The Special Committee nevertheless proceeded. After hearing, it submitted a report on July 18, 1960 finding Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; the House that same day adopted House Resolution No. 175 declaring him guilty and suspending him from office for fifteen months, and the legislative session adjourned. Respondents filed their answer on July 19, challenging the Court's jurisdiction, defending the House's disciplinary power (including suspension), and observing that the special committee ceased to exist with adjournment.
There is no dispute that Osmena made the imputations during his privilege speech and refused to produce evidence before the committee; the House imposed suspension for failure to substantiate and for the character of the statements. Petitioner also argued that (a) the Constitution gives complete parliamentary immunity from questioning elsewhere; (b) his speech did not amount to disorderly behaviour; (c) Rule XVII, sec. 7, barred later action because intervening business had occurred; and (d) the House lacks constitutional power to suspend a member. The Court examined these contentions, surveyed foreign and local precedents (including U.S. authorities and prior Philippine decisions such as Vera v. Avelino and the Alejandrino matter), considered separation-of-powers principles, and noted doctrine that parliamentary rules are procedural and may be waived. Although recognizing potential mootness because the committee had finished its work and the House session had ended, the Court nonetheless stated its conclusions on the constitutional and political-law issues before finally dismissing the petition.
Two separate dissenting opinions were filed. Justice Reyes, J.B.L. (dissent) agreed the Court lacked original jurisdiction for declaratory relief and certiorari but argued a writ of prohibition should have been available to prevent an unlawful attempt to divest petitioner of an immunity vested by the House Rules; he maintained that Rule XVI...(Pro-only)
Issues:
- Did this Court have jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s original action for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition against the Special Committee and its members?
- Does Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935/Republic Constitution (parliamentary immunity for speech or debate) bar the House from disciplining a member for words spoken on the floor?
- Did the adoption of House Resolution No. 59 (and subsequent action) violate House Rule XVII, sec. 7 by attempting to punish petitioner after other business had intervened?
- Does the House of Representatives possess the constitutional pow...(Pro-only)
Ruling:
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Ratio:
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Doctrine:
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