G.R. No. L-41192-93 - Ong Tiao Seng vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner Ong Tiao Seng challenged the decision of Judge Victorino A. Savellano of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who denied his notice of appeal in two civil cases (Nos. 70182 and 73572).
The denial was based on the court’s finding that the record on appeal was filed out of time as a motion for extension was submitted beyond the 30-day reglementary period.
The decision of the trial court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on July 21, 1975.

Petitioner received a copy of the original decision on January 16, 1975, which was subsequently amended with the amended decision received by counsel on February 7, 1975.
On March 6, 1975, petitioner, through counsel, filed a notice of appeal indicating awareness of the pending deadline.
A motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal was filed on March 14, 1975, by Atty. Mariano B. Remo on behalf of the counsel of record, Atty. Macario J. Fernandez.
The record on appeal was typewritten and finally filed on March 18, 1975.
On April 3, 1975, Judge Savellano issued an order denying admission of the record on appeal due to its untimely filing.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner (now represented by different counsel) but was denied in the order dated May 22, 1975.
Petitioner elevated his remedy by filing a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was ultimately dismissed.

The controversy stemmed from a vehicular accident involving a taxi cab owned by petitioner and a taxi driver, Cecilio Pascua, on December 22, 1966.
The accident involved collisions with a Ford vehicle owned by Gloria San Pedro and a Pontiac car owned and driven by James Yap.
Resulting from the collision were claims for damages for both physical injuries and property damage.
The trial court found petitioner and his driver liable for failing to establish diligence in the selection and supervision of drivers, among other negligence-related findings.
The trial court’s decision detailed specific awards for actual damages, moral damages, and attorney’s fees against the petitioner and his driver.

Petitioner asserted that his counsel’s illness (Atty. Macario J. Fernandez, who was confined to the hospital on February 21 and died on March 19, 1975) constituted an “accident” under Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
The motion for extension of time, however, was not supported by sufficient proof such as a medical certificate.
Moreover, petitioner’s counsel had been able to file the notice of appeal on March 6, 1975, which indicated that the illness did not prevent timely action.
The lack of a timely and sufficiently substantiated motion for extension, as well as the failure to supplement with requisite affidavits (as required under Rule 38), were critical in the negative ruling.

The trial court, and later the appellate court, relied on existing jurisprudence which mandates that any motion for extension of time must be filed within the original reglementary period.
The denial of the admission of the record on appeal was deemed proper based on the absence of justifiable reasons or a “good and substantial cause” as required under both the Rules of Court and established case law.
The record did not show particular circumstances or defenses that would merit the court’s discretion to suspend the strict filing deadlines.

Whether the record on appeal was filed within the prescribed 30-day reglementary period.
Whether counsel’s illness legitimately justified the failure to file the motion for extension within the allotted time.

Whether the motion for extension of time, filed on March 14, 1975, was adequately supported by evidence (e.g., a medical certificate).
Whether the absence of proper supporting affidavits under Rule 38 nullified the appellant’s claim of excusable negligence.

Whether the petitioner’s petition adequately established defenses and/or causes of action in support of the appeal.
Whether there is any substantive relief in re-evaluating the denial of the appeal under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 38.