G.R. No. 81958 - Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon

Petitioner Jose R. Oliveros was the incumbent mayor of Antipolo, Rizal for the term January 1, 1968 – December 31, 1971.
An information was filed against him for violations under Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) concerning acts committed during his term in office.
On September 25, 1971, following due notice and a hearing as earlier mandated by this Court, the lower court issued a suspension order directing that he be suspended from office within 24 hours.
Petitioner duly complied with this order and ceased holding the office during his term.

In the November 8, 1971 general elections, despite pending criminal charges stemming from the same anti-graft case, petitioner ran for reelection.
He won the election and was duly proclaimed mayor-elect for a new term from January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1975.
Pursuant to the Election Code requirements, petitioner took his oath and assumed office for the new term on January 1, 1972.

On January 17, 1972, the State, through the prosecutor, filed a criminal contempt petition against petitioner.
The allegation was that by assuming office in his new term, petitioner had willfully and deliberately disobeyed the suspension order of September 25, 1971, which the lower court had asserted was “still subsisting.”
The trial court, after hearing both sides, issued an order on January 26, 1972 declaring petitioner guilty of contempt and sentencing him to four months imprisonment along with a ₱300 fine.
Petitioner then moved for certiorari and prohibition, questioning the lower court’s imposition of contempt, particularly relying on the argument that the suspension order was limited to the previous term and did not cover the new term to which he was reelected.

Petitioner argued that his reelection by the people of Antipolo effectively meant that the suspension order did not apply to his new term, as it had been narrowly limited to the term during which the criminal information was filed and investigated.
The Court, while acknowledging that pending criminal cases may justify preventive suspension, held that any suspension applicable to a new term must be issued by way of a supplemental order and cannot be retroactively applied based on an order tailored for a previous term.
The en banc Court ultimately set aside the lower court’s contempt order on grounds of both legal and procedural inconsistencies, including issues of substantive due process and the ex post facto principle.

Whether a criminal offense for violating Republic Act No. 3019 committed by an elected public officer during one term can serve as the basis for preventive suspension in a subsequent term if the officer is reelected.

The petitioner conceded that his pending criminal case could justify suspension; however, he argued that the suspension order became inefficacious in his new term unless a fresh, supplemental suspension order was issued.

Whether petitioner willfully and deliberately disobeyed the suspension order by assuming office on January 1, 1972.

Petitioner contended that the suspension order of September 25, 1971 was directed only to his term in office (1968–1971) and did not contemplate his reelection, hence his assumption of office was made in obedience to the mandate of the electorate.
The lower court, however, deemed his assumption of office as a deliberate disobedience.