G.R. No. 186652 - Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio

Respondent, Tan Tiong Bio (a.k.a. Henry Tan), fully paid the installment payments for a 683‑square‑meter lot located in the Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project developed by Fil‑Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (Fil‑Estate) in Carmona, Cavite.
Despite complete payment, Fil‑Estate failed to deliver the title covering the lot.
Repeated demands by the respondent for the title and a refund of the purchase price were ignored by Fil‑Estate.

The respondent later discovered that the lot “sold” to him was inexistent.
In view of this discovery, he filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil‑Estate officials, including its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Alice Odchigue‑Bondoc (petitioner), and other employees.
In her Counter‑Affidavit, petitioner denied any participation in the acts or transactions alleged in the Complaint‑Affidavit, explicitly stating that as a Corporate Secretary she had never been involved in the management or day‑to‑day operations of Fil‑Estate.
Petitioner also disclaimed any dealings with Mrs. Ona or directly with the respondent, contesting the handwritten approval and endorsement attributed to her.

Based on petitioner’s allegations in her Counter‑Affidavit, the respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against her.
The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. PSG 03‑07‑11855 before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office.
The complaint for perjury was dismissed by a Resolution dated June 17, 2004 for insufficiency of evidence; the respondent’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.

On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Resolution on July 20, 2005, signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, which dismissed the petition for review under Section 12(c) of Department Circular No. 70 (the National Prosecution Service [NPS] Rule on Appeal).
The respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied by a Resolution dated January 23, 2006.
Dissatisfied with the DOJ’s action, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September 5, 2008, set aside the DOJ Secretary’s Resolution for grave abuse of discretion, holding that the dismissal lacked a clear expression of factual and legal basis violating Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
The appellate court clarified that the dismissal is governed not by Section 12 but by Section 7 of the NPS Rule on Appeal, which permits outright dismissal if the petition is patently without merit, intended for delay, or raises unsubstantial issues.

Petitioner’s and Respondent’s Arguments on Constitutional and Procedural Issues

Petitioner argued that Section 14, Article VIII applies only to decisions of “courts of justice” and not to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ.
She contended that the use of the term “outright” in the DOJ Resolution simply meant “altogether” or “entirely” and that Section 12(c) allowed the DOJ to dismiss a petition for review motu proprio.
The respondent maintained that constitutional due process requirements extended to quasi‑judicial and administrative bodies, citing cases (e.g., Presidential Ad hoc Fact‑Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto and Adasa v. Abalos) to argue that an “outright” dismissal without setting forth reasons was impermissible.
In his comment, the respondent emphasized that preliminary investigations, though inquisitorial, should not compromise the constitutional right to due statement of reasons when administrative actions affect the rights of parties.

The petition acknowledged that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi‑judicial proceeding; it is invitational and solely meant to establish whether there is probable cause to file a criminal information.
It was stressed that a prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not perform adjudicatory or rule‑making functions.
The Supreme Court noted that the DOJ is not a quasi‑judicial body and thus its actions in reviewing and dismissing petitions for review do not fall under the strict due process requirements imposed on courts.

The Supreme Court granted the petition for review on certiorari.
It reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision.
The Resolutions of July 20, 2005, and January 23, 2006, issued by the Secretary of Justice were reinstated.
The decision was penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with concurring opinions from Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag, and an additional member per raffle.

Does the requirement for a clear and distinct statement of facts and legal basis under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution apply solely to courts of justice, or does it also extend to executive departments such as the DOJ?
Is the Praxis of a DOJ Resolution exempt from the constitutional due process requirements that bind adjudicatory courts?

Whether the DOJ Secretary’s use of the term “outright” in dismissing the petition for review under Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal is proper and in accordance with law.
Whether the distinction between Section 7 and Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal was adequately observed and applied in dismissing the petition for review.

Does the preliminary investigation, being merely inquisitorial, require the same level of procedural formalities (such as an elaborate statement of reasons) as a quasi‑judicial proceeding?
To what extent does the nature of the preliminary investigation justify the dismissal without a detailed exposition of the evidentiary basis for reversible error?

How should the two‑step approach embodied in Sections 7 and 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal influence the DOJ Secretary’s discretionary authority in handling petitions for review?
Whether the outright dismissal of a petition for review, when the issues are deemed unsubstantial, complies with the statutory and rule‑based framework governing such actions.