Case Digest (G.R. No. 5760)
Facts:
Martin Ocampo et al. v. J.C. Jenkins, G.R. No. 5760, December 24, 1909, the Supreme Court, Johnson, J., writing for the Court. The petitioners (plaintiffs below) were Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Fidel A. Reyes and several co-defendants; the respondents included J.C. Jenkins, judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Dean C. Worcester, who had commenced the civil action. The petition sought an original writ of prohibition against Judge Jenkins to restrain him from proceeding with a pending civil libel suit filed by Worcester, and, as an interim measure, a preliminary injunction.
The antecedent events began with a criminal libel prosecution (styled U. S. v. Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes) then pending on appeal in the Supreme Court, based on an editorial entitled "Aves de Rapina" published in El Renacimiento. During the pendency of that criminal prosecution the Hon. Dean C. Worcester instituted a civil action for damages against the publishers and others arising from the same alleged libelous publication.
The petitioners did not dispute potential civil liability per se but contended that the civil action could not proceed while the criminal prosecution remained undetermined; they invoked precedent such as Almeida Chan Tanco et al. v. Abaroa and sought to enjoin the trial court as an extraordinary remedy. The court noted that the criminal and civil proceedings were founded not on the Penal Code but on Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, which both defined the crime of libel and expressly granted a separate civil right of action (see Secs. 1, 2 and 11).
The Supreme Court treated the original application for prohibition as an ordinary action (citing Enriquez v. Ambler and Blanco v. Ambler) and therefore considered only whether the petitioners were entitled to the preliminary injunction sought pending prosecution of their application for prohibition. The Court examined whether a criminal judgment in favor of the defendants (or an acquittal) would operate as res judicata or estoppel in the civil action and surveyed authorities (including U.S. Supreme Court and federal decisions) on the mutual exclusivity of criminal and civil remedies arising from the same acts. The trial court had not been enjoined; the Supreme Court, finding the petitioners’ facts insufficient to merit the extraordinary relief, denied the preliminary injunction. Torres, Carson, Moreland, and Elliott, JJ., concurred....(Pro-only)
Issues:
- Are the petitioners entitled to a preliminary injunction restraining the Court of First Instance from proceeding with the civil libel action while a related criminal prosecution is pending?
- Does a judgment in the criminal prosecution (or its pendency) operate as res judicata or an estoppel barring a civil action for damages arising from the same libelous ...(Pro-only)
Ruling:
- (Pro-only)
Ratio:
- (Pro-only)
Doctrine:
- (Pro-only)